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ABSTRACT

Title of dissertation:

An analysis of the trend in concessions and privatisation
in Ports: a case of Kenya and Tanzania.

Degree:

MSc

Privatisation and ports concessions are forging ahead all over the world, giving an
enlarged role to the private sector in the management and operation of port facilities.
This dissertation analyses the trends that privatisation and concessions are taking in
world ports with a view to identifying the methods and reasons governments are
increasingly adopting this concept.

At the same time its significance in port

competitiveness is assessed while taking into account its efficacy as a universal
panacea of problems in public ports.

The author starts by analysing the concept “sea port” and defining the controversial
term “privatisation”. Institutional reforms in the port industry are analysed pointing
out the changes that have taken place during pre privatisation and post privatisation
era and their reasons. This culminates into a sequential analysis where present
trends featuring port administrations and governments seeking bids from global
private terminal operators and major ocean carriers are made. Global operators’
dominance in port privatisation and a comparative study of Kenya and Tanzania
container terminals is discussed in details.

This scenario is evident in almost all

privatisation initiatives done through mainly concession and lease contracts.

The conclusion shows that there is still room for privatisation in ports as more
governments and port administrators are seeking international bids for port
concessions and lease contracts; thus the trend is bound to continue in the
foreseeable future. While the analysis shows that port privatisation is a concept that
has evolved to facilitate trade in a world where competition has become the
universal norm, it is neither a universal panacea nor peril.

KEY WORDS: Port Privatisation, Concessions, Lease Contracts, World Ports.
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CHAPTER ONE

1
1.1

INTRODUCTION
Background

Consistent with the worldwide trend to privatise the operation and often the
ownership of airports, highways, water supply, and wastewater treatment facilities,
governments in developed and developing countries are turning over port
operational responsibility and port assets to private enterprises. In most cases, the
public sector retains responsibility for essential statutory functions such as general
navigational safety regulations and contract monitoring and enforcement. In the
global environment, the role of government is waning while that of the private sector
is waxing.

Port operations in developing countries have a history of being inefficient due to
centralized bureaucratic management, high labour costs, obsolete equipment for
handling high volumes of cargo, and various financial problems.

Pervasive

inefficiencies in public ports in contrast to striking performance records of privately
run terminals have gradually induced governments to reconsider the organization
and management of their national port systems.

Governments of developing

nations have eventually come to realize that the port-as-a-business concept can
positively and significantly contribute to the national economy.

Privatization of ports has increased competition in costs and encouraged
autonomous investments and operations. This has cemented the conviction that
private participation is a universal panacea. However, defining port privatisation is
seldom easy and requires careful analysis. This is because the extent of private
sector involvement within ports can vary.
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1.2

Definition of the research problem

Concessions and privatisation of public service ports is a vexed subject. However,
there are widespread trends of global strategies in vertical and horizontal integration
evolving around port ownership and operations undertaken by a variety of market
players, both within and outside the international shipping and logistics markets.

Despite recent evidence of declining public support for privatization, the trend shows
resounding success of privatisation in competitive sectors. The author uses bids
and awards of concession and lease contracts by governments and port
administrators to global private terminal operators and shipping lines as indicators of
privatisation activities.

It is worth noting that the market environment in which ports operate has changed
significantly. Globalisation of trade and economies of scale have enticed shipping
lines to opt for mega ships. Also in order to improve terminal operation performance
and to integrate door-to-door transport, many shipping lines want to expand their
scope to include terminal operations.

Since carriers view ships’ time at ports as an expensive activity, the speed of
container handling and consequent vessel turnaround time is a crucial issue in
terms of competitiveness for ports. This is very important because ship owners
have put to service mega ships like the current world’s biggest container ship, the
MSC Pamela, of 9,200 TEU capacity (Reinikainen, 2006, p. 10). News has it that
from September 2006, Maersk will smash the world record with a new containership
named Emma Maersk. The real intake could be as much as 50% greater than the
biggest ships now in service. With seven tiers stacked on deck, and allowing for
visibility rules, the ship could carry around 13,500 TEUs (Porter, 2006, p. 1)

The potential trend for further significant port privatization programmes is also likely
to fuel the continuing participation of shipping lines into container handling via the
investments they are continuing to make in dedicated and multi-user terminals. This
is currently seen from shipping lines like Maersk line and others like CMA-CGM and
MSC. The continuation of the globalization policies of the major container terminal
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operators like Hutchison, PSA and Dubai Ports World and the further concentration
of the sector are also likely to feature prominently in the industry’s future.

The trend that port privatisation is taking can be clearly manifested by the apparent
active participation of these global terminal operators. Global terminal operators
have taken advantage of liberalisation of the maritime sector to gain foothold in
otherwise difficult markets through acquisitions and concession contracts. DPWorld
for example initially managed ports in the Middle East, Europe and India. Its first
project was at the Jeddah Port in Saudi Arabia, where it collaborated with local
partners on the operation of the South Container terminal. Its involvement with
Djibouti followed in January 2005 catapulting it on the world stage. It later gained a
foothold in Hong Kong, Tianjin and Yangtai in China and South Korea at the Pusan
New Port, Australia, Germany, Venezuela and the Dominican Republic.

Its

ambitions like many other terminal operators and major ocean carriers continue to
grow as will be revealed in the forthcoming chapters.

The fundamental rationale for the trend however, is the emergence of logistics and
supply chain management as mainstream concepts in business and the role of ports
and transport generally being part of the link within the wider framework of a supply
chain.

1.3

Objectives and scope

The purpose of this study is to highlight, analyse and offer recommendations on the
trend of concessions and privatization of ports and the competitiveness that comes
with it. Critical analysis of the past, present and forecast for the future are made
where the author believes concessions and privatization will be a common
phenomenon. In the research pertinent questions on the contemporary situation are
posed in order to address the topic exhaustively. These include:

1.

Is privatization and concession a solution for the present and the future? Is it
the universal panacea?

2.

Are labour unions a bottleneck for port efficiency and private sector
participation?
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3.

What role are global terminal operators and major ocean carriers playing in
port privatisation today?

4.

What does the future hold for privatization and port concession?

5.

Is there a place for port authorities in privatised ports?

1.4

Study Methodology:

For materials gathering, analysis and data collection, the research relies heavily on
literature survey and interviews conducted during port visits.

The author depended entirely on literature searches, drawing from published
material, networking with regional experts and Internet searches.

Much of the

published literature presents specific country experiences, which are not directly
comparable with global practices due to varying social, cultural, institutional and
economic factors. Instead, the findings are analysed and distilled into 'best practice'
recommendations, which are applicable under broad conditions.

Statistical analysis of data obtained from textbooks and World Bank privatisation
database, peer reviewed literature and information from port visits were used to
support the qualitative judgements.

Case studies are used to highlight specific

country situations. Visits to the European ports of France and Netherlands, Asian
Port of Singapore and East African ports of Tanzania and Kenya laid the
groundwork for a wider comparative analysis of the levels and trends of
privatisation.

1.5

Limitations of the Study

Efforts have been made to have a global representation of the literature and
situations, and interviews at ports done during field study visits. However as this
work deals with worldwide assessment, it cannot pretend to be exhaustive. There
were difficulties in acquiring comprehensive data held by private port operators
owing to official privacy and confidentiality.
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1.6

Summary

In order to take fully into account the complexity of the trends in privatisation and
concessions and the controversial viewpoints that will inevitably be encountered,
this study uses a gradual approach, consisting of six interrelated chapters. The first
two chapters clarify the precise context in which privatisation and concession
schemes are conceived and implemented.

This is done through an overview

description of the concept “seaport”, highlighting its functions, activities and model
management systems applied in ports in the world.

Chapters 3 to 5 endeavour to elicit the critical factors, principles and the status quo
in the port industry. This is tackled through a detailed analytical discussion of the
subject in a sequential analysis of trends in institutional framework changes, with
specific examples of past and contemporary situation featuring port administrations
and governments seeking bids from global private terminal operators and major
ocean carriers.

Viewpoints from both proponents and critics are analysed and

cases for and against the trend floated. This part shows the reasons behind the
great changes behind port management and operations. It also critically tackles
trends in port privatisation. Case studies and country experiences are given to show
the uniqueness of situations and approaches as well as to give further support and
paraphrases of facts.

While the author mainly relates to the question of the trend in port concessions and
privatisation, it is worth noting that the participation of the private sector in the port
industry proceeded at a pace adapted to the economic, political and social situation
of given countries. For example, the Kenyan and Tanzania cases are considered
because of the much-contrasted paces in privatization taking cognizance of the fact
that they are competing neighbouring ports. Port performance indicators are used
to illustrate and offer a comparative analysis.

Ultimately chapter 6 arrives at a conclusion drawn from the empirical analysis of the
research in light of the past, current and future prospects in the trend in privatisation.
Though the recommendations should not be interpreted as an infallible set of recipe
to be applied without due consideration, they are a guidance for port administrations
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and governments willing to involve private participants and also offer clarities of the
port privatisation trend. To take off one should as a prerequisite acquaint her/him by
bearing in mind what the concept seaport means. What is a seaport? The next
chapter describes this and its attributes.
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CHAPTER TWO

2
2.1

PORT INFRASTRUCTURE AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
Introduction

Chapter one has given an overview of the need that has driven administrations all
over the world today to opt for privatisation, but privatisation will not be a success
without the means and tools to offer those private services.

This chapter will

therefore analyse the infrastructure and superstructure available in ports and how
various types of port management models operate in the process of offering port
services. The transition between public to public/private partnership is analysed
showing the rationale and trend.

Due to the growth in competition between ports, governments are reorganizing the
way ports are run and permitting more private ownership and service delivery. The
potential for competition in providing these services depends largely on the assets
required to provide them. The economies of scale obtained by the transport of large
quantities of containers have led to the building of larger and more specialized ships
that require substantial port investments in new infrastructure and equipment to
serve them. But to start with what is a seaport?

2.2

Concept of a seaport

Article 1 of the Geneva Convention on the international regime of maritime ports of
9th December 1923, gives the definition “All ports which are normally frequented by
sea-going vessels and used for foreign trade shall be deemed to be maritime ports”.

Professor Alderton defines a port as a ship/shore or a maritime inter-modal
interface. Ports are areas where there are facilities for berthing or anchoraging
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ships and where there is the equipment for transfer of goods from ship to shore or
shore to ship (Alderton, 1999, p. 2).

A port is not only a tool, an interface between sea and land but also a logistical
platform where many tasks are performed (Francou, 2003, p. 2). Ports are vital in
many aspect of our day-to-day life and a vital element of a national transport
infrastructure. They play a great role in trade. World trade is growing faster than
World GDP as shown in Table 1 and Figure 1 and 2, and since 90% of this trade is
carried by sea, ports are indispensable tools to sustain it.
Table1: Growth in World trade against GDP

Year

1990-

2000-

2000

2004

2001

2002

2003

2004

Merchandise
Exports Growth (%)

6.4

4.2

-0.5

4

7

13

GDP at Market rate (%)

2.5

2.5

1.3

1.8

2.5

3.8

GDP at PPP (%)

3.4

3.6

2.4

3.0

3.9

5.0

Source: WTO and UNCTAD 2005
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Figure1: Growth in World trade against GDP
Source: WTO and UNCTAD 2005
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Figure 2 Growth in World trade against GDP
Source: WTO and UNCTAD 2005

From the statistics in Table 1 above, world economy deteriorated in 2001,
particularly in the aftermath of the tragic events of 9/11. Consumer and business
confidence weakened everywhere, and global growth declined. As the slow down
affected nearly every major region of the world, it was accompanied by a substantial
decrease in trade growth. The above data and subsequent graphs shows clearly
and paraphrase the fact that ports are very vital points along the logistics chain and
are indispensable for world trade and economy thus they have to be synchronised
with these two developments.

Ports are the points where all the major technological revolutions in the maritime
sector started or were influenced and are likely the place where future innovations
will take place. For example, it is where Malcolm Mc Clean containerisation concept
started on the 26th April 1956, when a converted tanker was loaded with 58
modified, 35-foot truck containers and sailed from Newark to Houston.

Many scholars have placed immense importance in ports. When Professor Gary
Crook of UNCTAD was asked for a suitable title for professor Alderton’s book “Port
Management and Operations”, he suggested “ports: the misunderstood key to
prosperity” (Alderton, 1999, p. V). In his key note address at the IAPH’s world port
conference in Kuala Lumpur in May 1999, Dr. Mahathir, the then Prime minister of
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Malaysia clearly contended that, no matter how information technology advances,
world trade cannot be materialised without ports. This is why every country needs to
develop much more advanced and efficient ports for its prosperity (Ports and
Harbours, 2000, p. 3).

Ports usually have a governing body referred to as the Port Authority, Port
Management or Port Administration. “Port Authority” is used widely to indicate any of
these three above terms. The term "Port Authority" has been defined in various
ways. A sufficiently broad definition of a Port Authority given in 1977 by the
Commission of the European Union as; a Port Authority is a state, municipal, public
or private body, which is largely of port facilities and, in certain circumstances, for
security.

Port authorities have responsibility over some of the maritime access infrastructure
such as breakwaters, navigational lights and markers and buoys and all elements
within the port area. However connections in the land network and other forms of
marine access are owned and maintained by the government. If the port authority is
the stevedore under The Hague rules it has the same duty of care as the ship owner
to handle the cargo properly and carefully (Scobie, 1976, p. 165).

2.3

Port Infrastructure

Ports have specially-designed equipment to help in the loading and unloading of
vessels. Private interests or public bodies may provide cranes and refrigerated
storage.

There is infrastructure outside the port useful for the port in terms of fluidity and
hinterland connection; this includes the roads, rail, air and inland waterways.
Seaport infrastructure can be basically categorised into the following; port area
which is defined as a complex of berths, docks, and adjacent land where ships and
cargoes are served, maritime access infrastructure which includes channels and
approximation zones, sea defence (breakwaters, locks) and signalling (lights and
buoys), port infrastructure which includes berths, docks and basins, storage areas
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and internal connections (roads and others) and land access infrastructure
consisting of roads and railways and inland navigation channels.

Port infrastructure has traditionally been designed and maintained directly by port
authorities except for the few fully privatised seaports. Public funds were used to
finance the building of new infrastructures. It was argued that these assets should
be in the public sector, to avoid the risk of monopolization by private firms. There is,
however, at present a global trend toward revising this model. Particularly there is a
move toward increasing the participation of private capital in the building of
infrastructure, generally through the use of concessions.

2.4

Port superstructure

Port superstructure is divided between the fixed assets built on the infrastructure
and mobile and fixed equipments including mobile plants and other types of cargo
handling equipment that facilitate operations at the shore side.

2.5

Ports economic activities

In this global economy and a shrinking world, ports play an increasingly vital role in
the nation’s economy. They help ensure the unfettered and efficient movement of
goods. They are the gateway for raw materials that feed the nation’s manufacturing
sector, supply high-tech electronic components, and fill the shelves of retail stores
with products that define our lifestyles.

Many ports have become the location for industrial clusters. Several notable port
centred industrial clusters have developed over the last 50 years including those in
Rotterdam, Yokohama, Marseilles and Houston.

Ports directly or indirectly provide jobs. More of port city’s jobs are linked to ports.
Port activities as well as services have been changing with time as the practice of
doing trade changes. Containerisation, which led to emergence of door-to-door
logistics, is by far one of the biggest influences of the radical changes ports has had.
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More than 60 % of world general cargo trade moved by sea is carried in containers.
This is a remarkable market penetration for a technology that dates only from the
mid-1950s. Since then there has been a continual increase in both number and
average size of containerships. These many and mega ships expect efficient and
effective services from the ports.

In general, modern ports offer two kinds of services: core and value added services
(World Bank, 2001, p. 9).

2.5.1 Core services
The core services include but may not be limited to the following: marine services
which are services like access and protection, pilotage, towage, vessel traffic
management, fire protection service and ship chandler: terminal services which are
such services like vessel tie-up services, container handling and transfers, container
stuffing and stripping and cargo storage.

Ports offer repair services in dredging and maintaining channels and basins, lift
equipment repair, dry dock ship repairs and container and chassis repairs. Others
are estate management services and information management services. A number
of these services can be outsourced to specialized private sector service providers.

2.5.1

Value added services

Additionally ports are delivering non-traditional services to their customers. These
non-traditional services typically expand the role of port service providers in the
supply chains of shippers. These services allow ports to participate in specialized
port service niches and to differentiate themselves from competing ports by means
other than price and turnaround times. They include services like reaffixing the
seats and installing automated dim light on ignition of imported cars done at the port
of Malmo in Sweden. Improving logistics in ports is now a widely accepted means to
improve their competitiveness.
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Having looked at the elements that defines a port and the activities within it, the next
section will highlight how private participation in ports entails, basing the argument
above on the discussion on services offered by ports and with reference to which
assets are involved and can feasibly be privatised. This is important because the
mode of operation of a port will greatly determine the type and quality of services
offered and thus the need to privatise.

2.6

Port assets and functions

Port privatization is emerging as an international trend, with a number of countries
moving ahead with plans to privatize ports despite protests in some instances by
unionized port workers. This section looks at the assets and functions of a port that
can be feasibly privatised because though there are many assets and departments
within a port that can be privatised, not all are feasible.

There are three essential elements of a port, which can be privatized either
individually or collectively: port land, port operations, and port regulations.

The

extent of privatization within ports can differ depending on which of these elements
are transferred from public to the private sector.

2.6.1

Regulatory Function

The port as a regulator element, combines a mixture of duties and responsibilities,
most of which will have been established by the law of the country. This regulatory
role is somewhat appropriately reflected in the port authority function.

Typically a port's regulatory duties and responsibilities include the following;
Maintaining the conservancy function, ensuring navigable approaches to the port
are well maintained and improved where necessary and that conservancy fees are
collected from port users: enforcement of applicable laws and regulations
particularly on matters relating to health and safety and which may also include
control of pollution within the port estate.
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Also important is safeguarding port users' interests against the risk of monopoly
formation, and the controlling of natural monopolies. The regulatory element of the
port is rarely privatised because of the aforementioned attributes.

2.6.2

Land owner

Land is another element, which can be privatised in a port. It is a very important
asset because it is where all the other assets rest. Ports are very often the largest
landowners within a city apart from municipalities.

Port estates can be very

significant indeed, as in Antwerp where the port authority controls some 125km of
berth length and occupies a land area in excess of 14,000 hectares.

The key tasks a port landowner will need to undertake include; managing and
developing the port estate, implementing port policies and development strategies,
supervising major civil engineering works, providing and maintaining channels,
fairways and breakwaters, providing and maintaining locks, turning basins, berths,
piers and wharves and, providing road access to the port complex. In view of the
strategic significance of port land, it is rarely privatised because of its intrinsic value
and scarcity.

2.6.3

Operations

Operations refer to the physical transfer of goods and passengers between sea and
land.

Traditionally this has meant stevedoring services but ongoing shipping

industry changes have led to the intrusion into this area of the business by specialist
terminal operators, and a number of shipping lines, especially in the container and
ferry industries, who now attend to their own landside operations.

Operations may also include a range of added value activities within the port estate,
such as warehousing, storage and packaging. This element, as will be seen later is
the mostly targeted area for privatization. This is because it is in this part of the
transport chain where bottlenecks are and has triggered enormous concessions.
This is one of the main causes why the trend in privatization is steady.
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Having looked at the elements in a port that can be privatised the question is to what
extent? The next section will look upon the extent to which the elements discussed
above are incorporated in the private sector control giving rise to multifarious models
on port management as seen next.

2.7

Port administration models

Indeed the popularity of privatization as a scheme towards port reform has inevitably
altered the governance of ports around the globe. This notion was supported by
Mary Brooks (2000) in a research forum in Canada when she contended that the
recent trend towards devolution in the port industry has spawned considerable
variety in the types of governance structures now in place around the world. The
nature of private sector involvement in port is guided by the adoption of a specific
management model amongst the different models in place.

Management of ports vary worldwide depending on numerous prevailing factors
including the socioeconomic structure of the country, the historical developments
and the types of cargo handled. The common port administration models are; the
public service port system, the landlord port system, the tool port system and the
private port system. Within these models many options are available as regards the
specific private participation a port desires.

This section looks at these models in order to offer an overview of the
characteristics associated with each because it is through the model applied in a
port that the scope and impact of private sector involvement and participation will
depend.

2.7.1

Service port model

Here the public port authority provides all services within the port including
ownership of labour. The port authority owns the land and all the available fixed and
mobile assets.

Service ports generally prohibit intra-port competition and are

monopolistic with negative effects on efficiency and performance. This type of port
administration is mainly used in ports in Singapore, India, Israel and some
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developing countries. The notable exception about this port administration model is
that despite it being touted as the crudest way of port management, the port of
Singapore using this system through Temasek, the Singaporean government
investment arm, is the busiest and one of the most efficient ports in the world as
shown in appendix A.

2.7.2

Tool port model

In this port management model the port authority owns, develops and maintains the
port infrastructure and superstructure including cargo handling equipment.

The

equipment operators in this system are port authority employees but other
operations are performed by private cargo handling firms onboard as well as on
quay. Examples of tool ports can be found in the United States, the Philippines,
Australia, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Mexico, Argentina and Chile.

2.7.3

Landlord port Model

It is one of the most common growing forms of port operation and its application is
on the upward trend. In this model, the port authority maintains ownership in the
port while the infrastructure is leased to private operating companies. The private
operating companies that lease from the port authority provide and maintain their
own superstructure, purchase and install their own equipment and provide their own
dock labour. In this system the responsibilities of the port authority as a landlord
include economic exploitation, long-term development of the land and the
maintenance of basic port infrastructure approaches, basins and berths.

Also the port authority is responsible for the landlord function, such as asset
management, partnership with private sector, and monitoring of fair competition,
regulatory function such as navigation control, safety and security, and environment
protection and facilitation function such as provision of port EDI, inter-port
cooperation and strategic marketing.

This type of port arrangement model is

common among European ports.
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2.7.4

Private port model

This model, as noted earlier in this study, is the system mainly used in the UK.
Here, the public sector no longer has any interest in port activities. Port land is
owned by the private sector. The private companies perform all regulatory functions
and operational activities. This system has not received much support from port
administrators mainly because the risk of abuse of the natural monopoly position,
that ports enjoy, is very high.

After looking at the different forms of port administration in place, the next section
will give an overview of the situation before privatisation and the post privatisation
era and how most public port management models failed to meet the expectations
of port users and governments.

2.8

Pre and post privatisation in ports

This section gives an overview of the chronology of how port privatisation evolved
overtime with a view to highlight how the privatisation trend started and why it built
to the status quo. This will give a suitable and necessary background on how the
trend in port privatisation has evolved and the rationale behind it. It will in this case
show why ports had to shift from the once proven model of total government
ownership to the otherwise new and consistent trend of private participation in ports
that is today.

As the saying goes, all great ideas go through three stages: In the first stage, they
are ridiculed. In the second stage, they are strongly opposed. And in the third
stage, they are considered to be self-evident. Now, privatization has reached the
third stage (IAPH, 2001, p. 98).

The port sector has radically changed over the past two centuries. During the 19th
century, ports tended to be instruments of state or colonial powers and port access
and egress were regarded as a means to control markets. Competition between
ports was minimal and port-related costs were relatively insignificant in comparison
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to the high cost of ocean transport and inland transport. As a result, there was little
incentive to improve port efficiency (World Bank, 2001, p. 1).

Private sector investment and involvement in ports emerged as a significant issue in
the 1980s. By this time, many ports had become bottlenecks to efficient distribution
chains of which they are an essential component. The factors that contributed to the
gradual systematic breakdown of service quality as illustrated by port congestion
and consequent chronic service failures include interalia these factors;

Labour unions often refused to accept reductions in the labour force and ignored the
need to upgrade skills.

Later, however, unions realized that port reform was a

necessity.

Slow paced centralized government control prevailed not only as a norm in socialist
economies, but also in many western and developing countries, where national port
authorities were often promoted by international development banks (World Bank,
2001, p. 3).

Lengthy bureaucratic procedures and unnecessary state intervention prevented
management from streamlining operations and reacting quickly to market needs,
which often delayed the implementation of needed changes. Decision makers were
often more responsive to a political or administrative hierarchy than to market
requirements and thus were interested in non-commercial objectives.

In the 1980s the dismantling of communist systems and the increasing introduction
of market-oriented policies on a worldwide basis opened the way for decentralized
port management and for reduced government intervention in port affairs.

Another reason was the inability or unwillingness of many governments to invest in
expensive port infrastructure or the wrong investment in infrastructure. During this
period a number of beautifully constructed port complexes became useless when
expected demand failed to materialize. Poor forecasts and inadequate planning and
strategies contributed to this failure.
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As a result of these failures in managing port development, governments have learnt
to rely increasingly on private investors to reduce ports’ reliance on state budgets
and to spread investment risks through joint undertakings.

Questions therefore

arose about the appropriate division of responsibilities between the public and
private sectors.

In some administrations like in Britain, it became increasingly clear that large scale
government involvement in port operations was counterproductive.

The role of

government in a market economy, they realised is to focus on monopoly abuse and
barriers to entry and exit.

The result was that concessions began, and which have had a major impact on
redrawing traditional boundary lines in ports. Some port terminals like in Singapore
have become highly specialized in the cargo handling services they provide and
manifest fewer of the characteristics of a public service sector raising a potential
controversial situation of the privatisation trend.

The trend is that ports are being integrated into global logistics chains, and the
public benefits they provide are taking on regional and global characteristics.
Private port service providers have become increasingly global in their scope and
operations.

Recently, a number of acquisitions, mergers and strategic alliances have been
formed both within the global shipping industry and the port services industry. An
example is the acquisition of the P&O Ports chain by Dubai Ports World (DPWorld)
in March 2006 and the most recent 20% share purchase of Hutchison ports
conglomerate by the port of Singapore Authority in May 2006.

Because of these global shipping and port service powers, port authorities will have
difficulties in defending public sector interests which brings us to our next discussion
on the trend in institutional reforms in today’s ports.
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2.9

Institutional reforms and regulations of ports

In the last two decades, a number of countries have undertaken or considered
institutional reform in the port sub-sector as a means to improve performance and to
reduce the government's financial and administrative responsibility. The interface
between the governments and the ports was too heavy and managers were unable
to manage the ports commercially. Technological change has also helped to set the
stage for reform because of the massive increases in labour productivity and in the
increased capital requirements of the port.

This has entailed the rethinking of

national port development strategies, as well as far-reaching reforms in the
legislative, regulatory, and managerial environment within which commercial ports
have to operate.

Changes and major trends in the administration in the maritime transport industry
can be attributed to two major technological changes during the last decade;
containerization which influenced construction of mega ships and liberalization of
world economies. These transformations have led to some new requirements for
seaports to modernize their infrastructures and to buy new equipment in order to
continue to be able to provide services to shipping companies.

Containerized shipping has brought profound changes to maritime transport,
including a shift from labour-intensive to more capital-intensive activities. Hence
revising the traditional organization of seaports was vital to prepare ports for a more
competitive market and less financial dependence on governments.

In his speech during the marking of 50 years in container shipping at the World
Maritime University on May 31, Mr. Gerald Malia, the representative of former
Chairman and President of ABS, Dr. Richard T. Soper, Commented that world
container shipping is growing at between 8% and 10% with China trade last year
accounting for 37% of the global TEU volumes, a fact that is also accepted by a new
report released by IBM Business Consulting Services which shows that near-term
profits in the market for container shipping services are at an all-time high and the
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market's growing at 8 to 10% per year. Forecasts also show that containerisation
will continue rising (see appendix E).

These developments have precipitated the need for new institutional reforms to
cope up with the new trends. Copying the old retrogressive habits and practices
does not augur well for the new trends and developments operating in a totally new
and different institutional atmosphere. Reforms in labour, operational and financial
fields have been paramount to guarantee success. Laws regarding working times,
remuneration and duties and responsibilities needed to be synchronized with the
new trends in the industry.

Institutional reforms in ports basically involve two steps; identifying the critical basic
public functions and responsibilities that will define the role of the national and local
public authorities in charge of the public sector; and secondly, identifying the assets
needed to support each function and category of services, assessing the adequacy
of these assets, and determining which among these to tender to private
operators/investors in to allow contestability. Ports and governments have been
adjusting to these realities to sustain port competitiveness through fundamental
regulatory and institutional reforms.

Supporting this argument, a global survey was conducted by IAPH on its members
(ports) to determine the extent of institutional reforms and the private sector’s
involvement in the port industry between 1998 and 1999.

There were 188 participating members, who represented 80% of the total ports
fraternity.

The vast majority of the 188 respondents indicated that their

organizations were public corporations established by government.

92% of the

respondents were public organizations. 71% of which were either a public agency
or corporation and 21% were department of governments. 7% of the ports were
private companies, and of these more than two thirds had a government
shareholding ranging from 60% to 100% (Baird, 2005, p. 125).
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Figure 3: Global representation of port ownership
Source: IAPH (1999)

The findings therefore suggest that the influence of private sector actors in ports is
growing and the trend in institutional reforms is mostly favouring the port as a
landlord model (partial privatisation) than comprehensive privatisation as shown in
Figures 3 and 4. Figure 3 also shows that there is a transition from the pure public
control to more private participation.
Regarding provision of stevedoring services, the private sector topped the Port
Authority and public body, though still marginally as shown in figure 4. Private
companies operated 36 % of the container terminals while 34% by port authority or
other public bodies (IAME, 2001, p. 253).
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Figure 4: Public and private port participation
Source: IAPH (1999)

22

The survey further indicated that the involvement of private companies had
increased especially in port operations within the last two years in 32% of the
member ports. It was also expected to further develop in 26% of the ports in the
next five years.

The main conclusions from the IAPH is that, it is mainly in port development and
terminal operations that the private sector has significantly expanded their business,
an area that is experiencing a greater role in private sector involvement. The role of
the port authority/public bodies in this regard is still significant especially in many
developing countries’ ports. The private sector now has an increasingly major role
in provision of stevedoring services, although the port authority is also significant in
this aspect as seen on Figure 4.

It should however be noted that, whilst the IAPH survey states that more ports are
considering some form of privatisation over the medium term, this is expected to
relate to private sector provision of port assets and port services, rather than outright
transfer of port property rights as in the UK. This brings us to another question,
what is the trend in port privatisation and concessions as actually seen in the
contemporary maritime events?
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CHAPTER THREE

3
3.1

PORT PRIVATISATION AND CONCESSIONS IN THE WORLD
Introduction

Over the last two decades, it can be inferred that the maritime sector has been
characterized by three major trends: globalization, containerization and port
privatization.

The prevailing process of change in international transport management from a
segmented modal approach towards a much more integrated transport concept
tailored to better meet the pressing needs of customer industries is resulting in an
increasing pressure on seaports to adapt their role and function to this more
demanding operational environment. In particular, there has been a need to define
new partnerships between the public and private sectors in port operations,
investment financing and asset management leading to a review of the respective
roles of public and private actors.

Port authorities are now having a major role to play in fostering the development of
an effective cooperation between interested public and private players, which will be
required to make it possible to achieve the expected benefits of integrated transport
and logistic operations.

This chapter gives light on what privatisation is and is not, why there is a
privatisation revolution, where it is prevalent or whether it is a global phenomenon
and which sector is mostly affected. Trends in privatisation will be analysed with
specific examples. This in effect will highlight and give evidence as to the visible
trends that are seen today with regards to the privatisation phenomenon. To start
with, what is privatisation?
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3.2

The privatisation concept

Privatisation is a term used to cover several distinct, and possibly alternative, means
of changing the relationship between the public and the private sector. Defining port
privatisation is seldom easy and requires careful analysis. This is normally because
the extent of private sector involvement within ports varies.

There are as many views on privatization as there are port assets that can be
privatised.

According to UNCTAD, privatization is the transfer of ownership of

assets from public to the private sector or the application of private capital to fund
investments in port facilities, equipment and systems (UNCTAD, 1998, p. 1).

Privatisation can be either comprehensive or partial. The latter takes the form of a
public-private partnership and is usually combined with the introduction of a landlord
port authority.

Comprehensive privatization remains an exception and is not a

preferred option for major ports as earlier said.

Privatisation takes different variations, which include divesture, deregulation, and
private

ownership

arrangements.

In

of

operational

developing

assets

countries,

with

market

privatisation

based

contractual

processes

through

concessions and management contract have been the most popular.

Privatization takes place only when there is a sale of public property to private
individuals. It is therefore important to note that the increased participation by the
private sector in the delivery of port services, without private investment, is not
privatization but devolution.

In that respect, only the New Zealand and the UK, following its 1991 ports Act,
actually privatized ports.

In most if not all other countries, most so called

privatization schemes were the development of private intervention in ports,
something quite different from privatization, and which had been in existence for
some time.

25

Privatization is as much a political process as an economic one and thus strong
government commitment is an indispensable condition.

In all successful

experiences, whether in the UK or New Zealand, governments have had decisive
roles, (UNCTAD, 1995, p. 18).

3.3

Objectives of privatisation and concessions

The most common aim behind a port seeking to bring in the private sector is to
increase efficiency, consequently to lower port costs, expanding trade as a specific
aim of privatisation and reducing the cost of investment to the public sector. Other
reasons may be to obtain management know how and increasing the speed of
developing new terminals, complying with ports and harbour legislation, developing
a public-private partnership, and increasing port revenues.

3.3.1

Why is there port privatization explosion?

Hardly more than an academic concept two decades ago, privatisation has emerged
within the past few years as one of the most significant challenges to public ports.
In many countries port development and management were under the direction of
public administrations with limited appreciation of changing market conditions and
as a result, port performance was often not demand responsive.

Pervasive

inefficiencies in national ports in contrast to striking performance records of privately
run terminals have gradually induced governments in some developing countries to
reconsider the organization and management of their national port systems.

Providing further impetus to the so called “global stevedores” (Peters, 2000, p. 11) is
the globalisation of production and the relentless pursuit of economies of scale
within the container shipping industry, which as earlier indicated led to mega ships
which in turn need larger scale port facilities that require private sector finance and
management expertise. Global stevedores (Table 2) are increasingly meeting these
requirements as the public sector continues to withdraw from cost-benefit style port
financing and frontline cargo handling operations.
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Table 2: Examples of Global Stevedores
Pure Private Stevedoring Companies

Major Ocean carrier terminal investors

HPH

APMT

PSA

MSC

Dowered

CMA- CGM

Source: Fairplay, 2006

However, a decision to privatise ports can be driven by a variety of forces. The
most common obvious is to relieve a financially strapped government by turning to
the private sector for an infusion of capital required to modernise and sustain port
operations, or to bolster the national treasury (Cass, 1996, p. 18). Government
controlled ports resort to privatization as a means to seek economic benefits from
improvement of operational efficiency by cutting labour costs, eliminating the public
monopoly and reducing port labour force. This is the rationale that is driving public
enterprise ports to be tempted into inviting private sector participation.

A study conducted by the World Bank in 1999 showed that the dominant motive of
port reforms and privatization is the cost saving advantage achieved through
efficiency provided by the private management as shown in figure 5.
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Figure 5: Reasons for Privatization Activity (1993-1998)
Source: Private Practices: a review of privatisation in state governments (1999)
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Figure 5 clearly shows that the positive trend in port reforms is mainly done with the
objective and reasons to cut cost from the public coffers.

However, the UK government, one of the pioneers of comprehensive privatization
models had five major reasons for transferring state-owned port assets to the private
sector. These were: to improve the management of the ports; improve efficiency;
raise revenue for the government; encourage employee share ownership as this
would help to further motivate port management and employees and; reduce the
power of trade unions (IAPH, 2001, p. 98).

3.3.2

Impetus behind full port privatization in the UK: A Case study.

The UK is the only example of a country having lengthy experience with
comprehensive port privatization though a number of ports still operate in the public
domain.

As mentioned in the previous section, British port structures have evolved in order to
respond to the needs of modernizing institutions and installations, many of which
dated back to the early years of the industrial revolution and also to make them
more responsive to the needs of users. It is argued that, the Ports Act 1991, which
started the full privatization process, could be successful only after the abolition of
the National Dock Labour Scheme in 1989. This Scheme had given port workers a
virtual guarantee of lifetime employment, contributing heavily to inefficiency and
subsequent poor financial performance in the port sector.

The composition of the boards in the trust ports in the UK was also a problem since
they were mainly composed of port users who opposed any move that was against
their interests.

Tariff increases that were authorized tended to be offset by

increasing labour costs, which increased steadily as a result of pressure from
organized labour, supported by the National Dock Labour Scheme (World Bank,
2001, p. 67).

Actually privatization in the UK began before the ports Act 1991 when the Thatcher
Administration privatized the British Transport Docks Board (BTDB) under the
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Transport Act 1981. Subsequently, the Associated British Ports (ABP) was
established, floating 49% of its shares in 1983.

As a result of the perceived

uncertainties associated with this process, only a few ports opted to pursue this
course. ABP now operates 21 of the UK's 51 major ports. It handles nearly a
quarter of Britain's seaborne cargo. This case gives an overview of the privatisation
process in the UK and which acts as a benchmark for administrations trying to
embrace comprehensive privatisation and why many governments have rejected the
model.

3.4

Impact of dock labour in privatisation

Port labour with their strong dockworkers union has been a handicap in most
privatisation processes as mentioned in the UK case. For example Spain’s biggest
dockers’ union, the Coordinadora Union, called a five day strike across Spain from
May 22 to 26, 2006 to object the manning changes proposed under a port bill to be
voted on by the parliament. It represents more than one fifth of all the Spanish
stevedores and the stakes are definitely high.

Other countries also had to adopt labour reforms for their privatisation processes to
succeed.

For example in New Zealand, in 1989, the employment minister

introduced the waterfront industry bill.

This was to normalise the employment

conditions of dockworkers. In France in 1987, the Government commissioned a
report, which called for the total deregulation of ports and an end to special dock
labour laws. Dock labour reforms were therefore introduced in 1991/92 (Jangana,
2001, pp. 17-174).

Is there homogeneity in the trends in privatisation? This is yet another question that
pops up that seeks to define the uniqueness of environments and therefore no
universal solution.

After discussing why there is such an upsurge towards port privatisation the next
section looks at the global trends in port privatisation seen to date. However in
tackling this question it should be noted that privatization is an umbrella term
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covering multifarious port reform models including concessions, lease contracts, and
commercialization. A distinction between the different forms of privatization
mentioned above arises through the scale and scope of private sector
engagements, that is, the level between partial privatisation, encompassing
concessions, and comprehensive privatization.

3.5

Global trends in concession and privatisation in ports

Participation of the private sector in the port industry proceeded at a pace adapted
to the economic and social situation of given countries. It should be recalled from
the previous discussion that privatization takes many forms from comprehensive
privatisation, as is the case with the UK, to partial privatization in the form of leases
and concessions. The trends in privatisation also differ regionally and globally. To
discuss the trends the concept has taken, an analysis is done covering the regions
and jurisdictions where the concept is marginal and those where it is prevalent thus
answering the question “where”.

3.5.1

Privatization trends by region

From 1990 to 2000, about 50% of privatization activity took place in Latin America
and the Caribbean. About 25% of the activities took place in East Asia and the
Pacific. The Asian financial crisis slowed Asian privatization substantially.
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Figure 6: Privatization revenues in developing countries, by region, 1990-99 ($US b)
Source: Global Development Finance, the World Bank (1998)

As seen from Figure 6, Latin America and the Caribbean have been leading in the
privatisation trend but Asia, Europe and Africa are coming up and emulating the
ideology. This shows that it is emerging as a global trend that will enter every region
of the world in the near future. It is however worth noting that it is not a blanket
application of the concept since some sectors are more involved than others, as will
be seen in the next section.
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3.5.2

Privatisation trends by Sector

Figure 7: Privatization revenues in developing countries, by sector, 1990-99 ($US b)
Source: Global development finance, and the World Bank (1998)

As seen from Figure 7 the infrastructure sector has been the major contributor in
terms of proceeds from privatization. Though in 1999, primary sector privatization
overtook infrastructure privatization, the trend continues especially in ports.

In response to the concentration trend that is unfolding in container shipping, a
number of terminal operators have opted for scale increases.

This is because

pursuing organic growth alone, container terminal operators realised is a lowest risk
lowest rewards strategy.

This trend as argued before is facilitated by the

liberalisation of the port industry.

3.6

Analysis of trend in concessions in ports

Investments in ports and terminal-operating companies have never been as great as
it is now. As one reporter, Neil Dekker in the Containerisation International Journal
of February, 2006 puts it, ports have suddenly become “sexy” (Dekker, 2006, p. 60).
This brings us to the question: What role are global terminal operators and major
ocean carriers playing in port privatisation?
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This section in tackling this question, details the contemporary situation in the port
sector as regards the trends in privatisation by giving current situation and projection
taking cognisance the pledges and forecasts made by port authorities.

3.6.1

Global private terminal operators

Encouraged by the ongoing wave of privatisation of port facilities especially in
container operation, global terminal operators have resorted to the pursuit of higher
risk growth strategies and have progressed from being single location players into
the global market, for example HPH and Maersk line amongst others.

A number of global port operators reported network expansion due to
encouragement from the increasing port administrations opting to involve private
participation in their port operations. Some more recent development and trends
are cited below in the port sector between 2004 up to today which bolsters the
notion that the trend is positive and is not seemingly going to slowdown.

The Port of Singapore Authority (PSA) started by building a stronghold at its home
base in Singapore. Buoyed by the performance and profits it is establishing itself as
an international benchmark and has started investing outside internationally.
Recently in May 2006, PSA bought a 20% share in HPH for $4.388 billion further
widening its international operation.

According to Fock Siew Wah, the Chairman of PSA, PSA is making long term
investment in the maritime sector. The strategy is to expand globally and reach all
possible markets to widen the customer base (Marle, 2006, p. 7).

International Container Terminal Services Inc (ICTSI) from the Philippines has
completed an $80 million development of Gdynia, Poland and secured a lease to
operate terminals 9 and 10 of the trans-shipment hub of Naha in Okinawa, Japan
together with six Japanese stevedoring companies. Guam Container Terminal in
the US territory is beginning negotiations with ICTSI to privatise its container
facilities.
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In mid 2004, the Russian government discussed the disposal of 20% of the public
ownership for the ports of Novorossiysk, St. Petersburg, Murmansk and Tuapse. It
was thought that it would relieve the burden of the public sector and improve
efficiency in the public enterprises.

In Belgium, in April, 2004, P&O Ports (now DPWorld), which held 67.5% of the
shares of Antwerp Gateway, added 3.5 million TEUs of capacity to its operations in
this port by signing a 40-year concession for the east side of Deurganckdok.

More recently between 2005 and 2006 the following concessions and leasehold
contracts took place, while some are even at the planning stages for the future,
further confirming the continuity in the trend.

In Spain, Hutchison port holdings, (HPH) in May this year (2006), won a 30 year
concession to build and operate Barcelona’s 93 hectare Prat Container Terminal.
This concession according to the Managing Director of Hutchison Mr. John Meredith
will be an investment of $854 million (€ 660m) and will bring to the port of Prat an
annual traffic of over 4 million TEUs per year.

Projections from this deal are

estimated that 33 million TEUs will be brought between 2008 and 2022. Apart from
this deal Hutchison also has gained central government approval for its bid for a
33% stake in Huizhou port Affairs Group, a state owned port business operator in
southern China’s Huizhou City, in Guangdong province (Maritime Asia, 2006, p. 5).

It should also be recalled that HPH has concession holdings in Northern Europe in
Rotterdam and also the UK in Felixstowe and Thames port. This is not the end of
the story since Hutchison has future ambitions in Turkey and Egypt.

Many private terminal operators are trying to penetrate the Asian market since it is
the biggest player especially China, with booming container trade and with most of
the largest and most efficient ports in the world. In May Lloyd’s list published its top
container 20 ports and 13 of the world’s top 20 ports were in Asia with the top six
being Singapore, Hong Kong, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Pusan and Kaohsiung in that
order (Maritime Asia, 2006, p. 2).

35

Another player which is fast coming into the scene is the Dubai based DPWorld.
The Government of Pakistan for example opened its doors for concession bids from
DPWorld that recently in February this year overpowered PSA to purchase the P&O
ports conglomerate at $7.3 Billion. According to UAE Premier Sheikh Mohammed
Bin Rashid Al Maktoum and Pakistani Prime minister Shaukat Aziz, DPWorld is
investing $10 billion in ports related projects, two in Karachi and Gwadar. By virtue
of purchasing P&O terminals, DPWorld is also in charge of port Qasim initially
operated by P&O.

The main interest however of DPWorld is the newly constructed deep-sea port at
Gwadar, Pakistani’s deepest port, which was funded through collaboration with
China.

It is expected to commence work by the middle of this year (2006).

DPWorld has already been awarded a 30-year concession to manage the container
terminal by the Pakistani Government.

Interestingly, DPWorld was not bidding

alone, there were other very serious bidders like HPH, PSA International, Globe
Marine services of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan International Container Terminal.

In South Korea, the government awarded DPWorld a concession in conjunction with
Samsung Corporation where it has invested in a new Pusan container terminal. In
January 2006 the terminal was opened by the South Korean president, Roh Moo
Hyun to a burst of fireworks (Marle, 2006, p. 38). This investment is seen as an
answer to the Chinese big investment of the Yangshan container terminal.

It is also interesting to note that the Yangshan deepwater project has also been
given to a private participator. The Shanghai municipal government in December
2005 selected a five strong consortium headed by HPH and APMT to build and
develop the second phase of this project estimated to cost $850 million and
scheduled to be completed by December 2006. In this consortium, HPH and APMT
will both take 32% stakes, while the Shanghai International Port (Group) Co. Ltd.
16%, COSCO Pacific were awarded 10% and China Group 10% of the remaining
shares (Kuai, 2006, p. 87).
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In Yemen, June 2005, the government awarded DPWorld a 30-year contract to
develop and manage the Aden and Ma’lla container terminals at Aden. This is in
addition to another concession in May 2005 where it had taken over the
management of UAE’s ports, Mina Zayed and Fujaira (Stephannie, 2006, pp. 5859).

According to Marcus Hand in Singapore, July 4 2006 in the Lloyd’s list, ICTSI is
vying with DPWorld for a new US$200m container terminal in Surabaya, as well as
issuing bonds to cover expansion in Manila. They are interested in constructing
Teluk Lamong, says the Indonesian Minister for Transport Mr. Hatta Radjasa.
According to press reports in Indonesia, the two companies have bid to build Teluk
Lamong port, part of the expansion of Tanjung Perak in the eastern industrial city of
Surabaya. The US$200m first phase would have a capacity of 1.3m TEUs. It
should be remembered that, DPWorld runs the existing container terminal at
Tanjung Perak, part of its acquisition of P&O ports.

The government of Brazil is increasingly involving private participants to the already
big presence of global terminal operators like APM Terminals at Teconvi container
terminal.

For example a niche operator, the portonove Terminais portuarios de

Naveganteshas has been granted a 25-year concession, with an option for a 25year extension, for the portonave project of constructing a new container terminal on
a Greenfield at Navegantes. Portonove Terminais portuarios de Naveganteshas is
to build a 900 meters long quay, 12 meters depth-30,000 TEU capacity terminals
and is scheduled to open in August 2007 (Fossey, July, 2006).

The trend is such that the profit accruing from the business is luring more and more
private investors both from the shipping and stevedoring companies. It is forecasted
that if the trend continues like this by the year 2008 the first four top private
operators will control over one third of the total container port capacity.

This clearly shows how much governments are considering private participation in
the port sector all over the world and a confirmation of how the trends in
concessions are climbing.
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3.6.2

Major Ocean Carriers

As noted earlier on the trends in concessions governments and public run ports are
inviting concession bids not only from private port operators but also vertically from
shipping lines.

Maersk line for example is already in Rotterdam delta terminal,

Algeciras in Spain, Salalah Oman, US East, West and Gulf coasts, and Washington
to name but a few. However, recently other players in shipping are joining the
lucrative race.

In Germany, June 2004, MSC, one of the few large container carriers with few
interests in container terminals, set up a joint venture with Eurogate called MSC
Gate Bremerhaven to operate a dedicated terminal in this port. A similar previous
deal involving Maersk highlighted this port’s strategy of having dedicated terminals
(UNCTAD; 2005, p. 80). According to Emmanuel Schiffer, Chairman of the group
management board at Eurogate, a joint venture between Eurogate and APM
Terminals is set to take off for the new Eurogate Container Terminal at
Wilhelmshaven expected to commence in 2010, whereby Eurogate will have 70%
and APM 30%.

In Cameroon, July 2005, APM Terminals, Maersk’s subsidiary, reported adding new
terminals to its portfolio for example, in Douala after winning a 15-year concession.
In Nigeria, it has recently been confirmed that APM terminals has won a tender to
run the Lagos container terminal in Nigeria (Robinson, 2006, p. 10).

In India, Maersk was awarded a 30-year lease jointly with Container Corporation of
India for the third terminal of Jawarharlal Nehru Port. In Italy, Maersk has emerged
as the sole shipping industry bidder on a project to build and operate a major new
container facility at the port of Savona. Maersk is part of a consortium that includes
engineering and construction companies Grandi Lavori Fincosit and Technital.
Those reported to have shown strong interest ranged from DPWorld to Contship to
Hutchison. The new facility will take capacity to 1million TEUs per year, Savona
port president Cristoforo Canavaro said.
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In France, the Le Havre Port authority granted 36-years concession to Maersk’s
subsidiary, the APM Terminals, along with the Perigault group to develop the
second container terminal in Le Havre’s port 2000 basin. A two berth common user
facility with a quay line of 700 meters with a draught of 16 meters and an annual
capacity of 630, 000 TEUs is scheduled to commence operation in 2007 (Hooper,
2006, p. 13).

The French owned CMA-CGM; the third largest liner shipping is also getting more
into the Container business.

According to the Senior Vice president container

logistics, Jean-Francois Mahe during a conference on TOC in May, 2006 in
Hamburg, the company is looking to establish an extensive global network within a
couple of years in order to secure

competitive operations.

The company is

investing in the Chinese Container terminal sector through investment in the ports of
Tianjin and Shanghai.

In the US, CMA-CGM has signed a 10-year, $120 million contract with Virginia
International Terminals (VIT), the Virginia port authority’s executive director Mr.
Robert Bray has disclosed to Containerisation international. CMA-CGM has
guaranteed an annual throughput of 100,000 TEUs (Fossey, July, 2006). The group
also holds 10% to 100% shares through its subsidiary terminal link across Europe,
Africa and America.

The above show how the trend in privatisation and concessions is headed even for
further upward heights because lucrative port business coupled with inefficiencies in
ports are driving governments and private terminal operators to tie the two. The
realization of the concept of privatization requires the reliance of various modes of
privatization. Chapter 4 deals with this subject.
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CHAPTER FOUR

4
4.1

PORT PRIVATISATION: MODES AND METHODS
Introduction

Chapter 3 discussed the world trends in port privatisation from a historical
perspective and through the status quo as it is today and showed that there are all
the signs that the positive trend is poised to continue. In order to attain the goal of
port privatization there are various methods or forms through which this concept is
applied because no one port is similar to another.

4.2

Methods of port privatisation

There are multifarious forms of privatization (see Table 3), depending on port size,
objectives of privatization and initial conditions ranging from leasehold contracts,
Licences and Concessions, Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT), Build-Own-Operate
(BOO) and Build-Own-Operate and Transfer (BOOT) arrangements (UNCTAD,
1998, p. 2). Others are service contracts, operation and maintenance contracts
(IAPH, 2001, p. 100).

The most prominent and common amongst these models is contracting out which
involves the awards of concession and lease contracts. These are forms of partial
privatization whereby only part of the assets and activities of a public port body are
transferred to the private sector. It is different from comprehensive privatization
whereby a successor company becomes the owner of all land and water areas as
well as of all assets within a port’s domain (UNCTAD, 1998, p. 2).
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Table 3: Spectrum of port reform tools
Public Management and operations
Outsourcing
Management contracts
Lease and rent contacts
Full concession including BOT/BOOT etc
Build, Own, Operate (BOO)
Divesture by sale
Source: World Bank port reform toolkit Module 3 (2001)

A study carried out by the World Bank revealed that the most popular forms of
private participation in majority of public sector enterprises including ports are
contracting out in the forms of concessions and lease contracts as shown in Table 3.
It is such a popular strategy that it has become synonymous with any port
privatization. Whenever a port reform project is underway the great majority of
administrators will have concessions and lease contracts on their table as favourite
alternatives. Figure 8 shows how a survey conducted in the US confirms this fact.
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Figure 8: Popular Modes of port privatization
Source: Private practices: a review of privatization in state governments, 1998 (USA)

Figure 8 clearly shows how leasing and concessions are preferred more than any
other methods of privatisation.

There are two main forms of contracts used in ports today: A concession contract
and a lease contract. A description of the various forms of privatisation is given to
highlight their attributes and explains why the trend is that these particular models
are widely applied.

4.2.1

Concession contracts

Concessions are a centuries old system of operation of public utilities, inherited from
Roman law (Cass, 1996, p. 44). Belgium, France the Netherlands and Spain are
countries where concession of port facilities, on public land, under public control,
has been the rule for many decades.
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In concession contracts, the operator covers investment costs and assumes all
commercial risks.

Such contracts are often combined with specific financing

schemes such as Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT).

According to the world bank, a port concession is a contract in which a government
transfers operating rights to private enterprise, which then engages in an activity
contingent on government approval and subject to the terms of the contract (World
Bank, 2001, p. 52). A concession gives the private partner responsibility not only for
the operation and maintenance of a utility's assets but also for investments. Asset
ownership remains with the government, however, and full use rights to all the
assets, including those created by the private partner, revert to the government
when the contract ends, usually in about 30 years.

Concessions are often bid by price: the bidder that proposes to operate the utility
and meet the investment targets for the lowest tariff wins the concession. They are
governed by a contract that sets out conditions assigning the government two
primary tasks: to ensure that the utility assets which the government continues to
own are used well and returned in good condition at the end of the concession and,
secondly through regulation, to protect consumers from monopolistic pricing and
poor quality of service.

These characteristics distinguish concessions from management contracts on one
end of the reform spectrum and comprehensive port privatization on the other.
Concessions, by permitting governments to retain ultimate ownership of the port
land and responsibility for licensing port operations and construction activities,
permit governments to safeguard public interests. At the same time, they relieve
governments of substantial operational risks and financial burdens. This is one of
the reasons that make this model have the most positive trend amongst the family of
private participation models.

Globally, concession agreements between port regimes and private companies are
implemented through different modalities. The main schemes in use are BOT, BOO
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and BOOT.

Concession arguably is the most admired method of private

participation in public assets as noted above.

4.2.2

Lease contracts

This involves modalities where an operator enters into a long-term lease on the port
land and usually is responsible for superstructure and equipment. Lease contracts
and concession contracts share the following same major characteristics; the
Government or public port Authority conveys specific rights to a private company,
have a defined term (10-50years), and directly or implicitly allocate financial and
operational risks.

In a lease contract a private firm is given a long-term lease to develop (within its own
funds) and operate an expanded facility. It covers its investment plus a reasonable
return over the term of the lease and pays a rental fee.

There are three basic forms of lease in use today: flat rate, "mini-max," and shared
revenue leases (World Bank, 2001, p. 52).

Flat rate leases give the lessee the right to use a fixed asset for a specific period of
time in exchange for periodic payments of a fixed amount. The main advantage of
this form of lease is that both parties know the lease rent in advance. The flat rate
lease also provides to the lessee the greatest incentive to fully use the available
capacity of the terminal.

In the mini-maxi lease the lessor gives to the lessee the right to use a fixed asset for
a specific period of time in exchange for a variable lease payment. There is a
minimum and a maximum payment depending on the level of activity recorded.

In a shared revenue lease, the lessor gives to the lessee the right to use a fixed
asset for a fixed period in exchange for a variable amount of money.

As

distinguished from a mini-max lease, in a shared revenue lease, there is a minimum
payment regardless of the level of activity, but no maximum payment. The main
characteristics of the shared revenue lease are that there is a minimum level of
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compensation, there is no established maximum level, the only limit on the
maximum compensation is the facility’s terminal’s capacity and that the minimum
compensation may not fully cover the interest and amortization of the lessor (Port
Authority) for the lease area.

The attributes of the above mentioned modes of privatisation either lures or scares
port administrators because of their associated advantages and disadvantages. Is
privatisation, in its different forms, a panacea for the myriad of problems in ports
today? The next section discusses this question.

4.3

Advantages and Disadvantages of Privatization and Concessions

Having looked at the various trends sector-wise and regionally that port privatisation
takes, the most preferred modes of attaining the privatisation goal, and the reason
why perhaps the trend seems to incline on concessions and leases, this section will
in turn seek to highlight the pros and cons of privatisation and how the port
privatisation forms have faired on internationally with a view to show that despite it
being on the rise there are no guarantees for success.

However, it should be

remembered that most of the privatization activities happening today in the ports are
in the container handling business.
Is privatisation a panacea for the myriad of problems in ports today? This is one of
the questions lingering in the minds of many governments and administrations faced
with port reforms. Confusion has arisen in the maritime industry because of the
contradictory perception by maritime experts and pundits.

Cases of successful

public run ports like the Port of Singapore against the notion that privatisation is the
answer to inefficient public administration of ports have created a sort of quagmire.

There are numerous success stories where port authorities have transferred to the
private sector operations previously performed by the public sector through
concessions. Cases of success as well as failures are hereby given to show that
though the process has generally succeeded in many ports, it is not a blanket
success because the privatisation process proved in some cases a total fiasco.
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Different authors and experts have different and divergent views about the
privatisation concept and the best port administration models.

For example, a

paper published in the journal, Maritime Policy and Management by Saundry and
Turnbull in 1997 indicated that the promises of greater competition, greater
investment and improved commercial efficiency had not occurred in UK ports due to
privatisation (Alderton, 1999, p. 93).

That is to say privatisation per se cannot

guarantee success.

Not everybody therefore in the maritime sector has supported this idea as a
universal panacea.

The perennial objection to privatisation by politicians and

bureaucrats running public sector businesses is that they can manage as well as the
private sector. This is today's version of the fatal conceit of central planning.

Some critics argue that ports are natural public assets and must remain in the public
domain, as they are important to national security. In case of a war, the first targets
are ports. Naturally, such strategically important assets must always be under the
control of a public authority.

Critics opposed to the trend are like the vice president of Water Transport Workers
federation of India, Mr. K.V.A. Iyer.

This federation is one of the five major

federations representing port and dockworkers in the country, and is spearheading
the agitation against privatisation of ports.

Mr. K. V. A. Iyer, who spoke to Business Line in an interview on, August 29, 2005
says, “Privatisation does not promote the interests of ports or the country”. He
advised the Association against transferring of public assets to private players for
operating container terminals through BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer) route. Mr Iyer,
who is also the Working President of the Cochin port Labour Union, strongly
opposes transferring of ownership or control of ports to multinational companies.

Excerpts from the interview reveal that though he agrees with the findings from the
IAPH study in 1999, which confirms that the influence of private sector actors in
ports is growing, he insists that the role of public sector agencies also remains
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significant, so ports must remain in the hands of the government and operated as
public entities because the benefits from privatisation accrue to a very small section
in society.

Another critic opposed to the trend is Ms Meritiria Turei, an MP of Green Party in
New Zealand who was quoted in the article “Let failed bid be a sign - port should be
retained by public” on 13th April 2006 in a press release of the Green party of
Aotearoa New Zealand.

Ms Meritiria Turei says “Public assets like Lyttelton port must be retained in public
hands. The returns from such assets, built up through investment of public funds,
should be directed into the communities who support them.” She believes that if
Lyttelton port is sold, even in part, to a private company, money will leak out of the
community into overseas hands, which is unacceptable.

The interesting observation from some literature is that some public ports notably
the port of Singapore, a world class government owned port, are doing extremely
well that privatisation is sometimes seen as no panacea for the current problems
facing the ports.

However, as Victor Hugo, the great French author once said, “An invasion of armies
can be resisted, but not an idea whose time has come." It is therefore difficult if not
impossible for the critics to stop the idea of privatisation.

Despite the views from the critics and pundits of the trend, privatization in any of the
forms mentioned above has the following advantages and disadvantages.

4.3.1

Advantages of privatization and concession: cases of success

Conflicting interest, national esteem, attitudes rooted in traditional values and
misguided market assessment have been strong counter forces of privatisation, but
as the effects of fiscal crises and deteriorating trade performances have become
more pronounced, a growing number of governments have started to adopt
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privatisation due to the benefits attached. This fact is supported by Cass when he
says privatisation in certain circumstances holds the promise of stimulating
economic growth particularly for those whose livelihood depends directly on port
activity and trade (Cass, 1996, p. 5).

The benefits of privatisation and concessions in particular in the port sector include:
Better and more efficient port operations performed by private operators. Giving
contracts to experience and world-renowned operators like Hutchison will have a
managerial input in the departments lacking the efficiency required. For example
privatisation of the Jeddah port has remarkably reduced waiting time for container
ships from 5.6 hours in 1996 to 0.4 hours in 1999 as seen in Table 4 and Figure 9
(Bakr, 2001, p. 52.)

Table 4: Waiting time at Jeddah port 1996-1999 (Hours)

Year

1996

1997

1998

1999

5.6

1.2

0.7

0.4

Waiting
time(Hrs)

Source: Jeddah port (2001)
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1997

1998

1999

Year

Figure 9: Waiting time at Jeddah port 1996-1999 (Hours)
Source: Jeddah Port (2001)
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Privatisation allows application of private capital to socially and economically
desirable projects, freeing up government funds for other priority projects and by so
doing proper allocation of scarce resources is done. Concessions thus relieve the
finances of the grantor.

Concessions lead to transfer of risks for construction

finance and operation of the facility to the private sector by the port authority
engaging in other less risk departments and where it is needed most, like the
regulatory function, is another attractive factor for privatisation.

Concessions lead to attraction of foreign investment and technology by the port
authority. For example, under BOT the assets will be transferred after the end of the
contract making the port better off than it was before the contract and acting as an
indirect investment for the port.

Arising from these advantages, there are cases where privatisation was a great
success as follows;
In Argentina, the award of terminal concessions to four competing companies in
1994 in Buenos Aires brought down handling charges significantly through improved
labour productivity.

In Panama, between 1995 and 1998, Panama transferred port assets in operations
to the private sector and the result was an attraction of more than $380 million in
investments for modernization and expansion.

In Saudi Arabia, the privatisation of the Southern Container Terminal, Jeddah in
1997 led to enormous improvements in both productivity and equipment fleet.
Handling just under I million TEUs a year before, it is now one the biggest container
terminals in the Middle East and among the top 50 worldwide.

The award of the

tender by the Saudi Government to DPWorld has solved problems of equipment,
infrastructure and operations related problems. This led to a productivity gain of
33.5% in container handling by 1999 (Bakr, 2001, p. 104).

This was an

achievement to the Saudi economy and their central aim of privatisation, which was
to increase the number of Saudis working in the ports industry, a policy they called
“Saudisation”.
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In the UK, the abolition of the National Dock Labour Scheme in 1989 and similar
labour reforms in other countries for example in Italy, France and Spain has paved
the way for the public sector to withdraw from port operations. If it were not for
these port reforms, the UK case would not have been a success either.

In Kenya, there was some partial management transfer of the container terminal in
Mombasa to a commercial terminal operator, the Hutchison’s Felixstowe port
consultants, which resulted in a short lived replacement of outdated equipment,
bureaucratic procedures streamlined and productivity of the terminal improved.

4.3.2

Disadvantages of privatization and concession: cases of failure

As already put forward by those against the trend, Ms Meritiria Turei of New Zealand
and Mr. K. V. A. Iyer of India, who maintain that privatisation is not the universal
panacea for the current bottlenecks in ports, there are associated drawbacks that
inevitably threatens administrators who do not thoughtfully consider the concept.

Baltazar and Brooks (2001) contend that full privatization is not necessary and that
alternative devolution models can be successful if the appropriate governance
model is present. This view is not a radical one. As Caves and Boardman and
Vining showed, the private sector does not always outperform the public sector
(Brooks, 2004, p. 180). Privatisation in ports is criticised because of the following
drawbacks;

There is a potential monopolistic tendency associated with privatisation schemes.
Concessions have shortcomings and have not always been popular with all
governments because of the dominant position of the concessionaire. They are
perceived to have a considerable tendency to transform into an oligarchy of port
service providers.

In developing countries, there is an unwelcome feeling amongst the populace that
port privatisation will lead to few private firms taking control of the strategic
economic units like the ports without due regard to the welfare of the nation. The
general argument is that even if privatisation enhances ports efficiency, the bulk of
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benefits will accrue to privileged few whereas the costs are borne by the many,
particularly taxpayers, consumers and workers consequently reducing overall
welfare. Thus it has negative distribution of wealth, income and political power.
More disturbing is the fact that with little competition, the profit maximization drive of
private ports could often result to price discrimination and expensive port services.

There are also complains that concessions lack transparency. As Cass puts it, the
concessionaire is often subjected to pressure to employ staff designated by the
Government or port authority or provides additional free services (Cass, 1996, p.
45). Therefore concessions have sometimes been breeding grounds for corruption
and patronage.

Winning bids are sometimes based on unrealistic financial projections, placing the
sustainability of the concession agreement in jeopardy. This is caused by some
desperate investors who lack the vision and forecasts and place unrealistic bids only
to fail within a short term.

There is danger that a concessionaire will not properly maintain the facilities under
concession, returning them to the government in bad condition; or the danger that
the concessionaire and the Port Authority disagree on the operational need for and
financial feasibility of critical investments.

A recent example involves a case in

Indonesia where the government is threatening to buy back the 51% of HPH shares
in Jakarta International Container Terminal (JICT) for alleged slow tracking (Rao and
Mccawley, 2006, p. 12). HPH is criticised for using JICT as a mere feeder terminal
for Malaysia and Singapore ports.

Some critics also argue that the private sector is not concerned with externalities,
which are an important issue for many goods and services the governments provide.
Externalities are an important factor in infrastructure projects or projects with
environmental consequences.

As Professor Ma of WMU contends externalities

require significant consideration in a project’s cost benefit analysis. The problem is
that polluters and sufferers are different bodies (Ma, 2005, p. 128).
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Further buttressing the arguments against this concept are cases of failure that the
critics base their support as below analysed to illustrate their ideologies:

According to Professor Meletiou, in a port privatisation conference in Portugal
(2000), it was estimated that by 1998 there were 100 contracts for port concessions
(most related to container terminals), for a total estimated private investment amount
of $6.3 billion. Geographically, however, imbalances were significant with 42% of
the projects signed were in Latin America and Caribbean region, 5% in the Middle
East and North Africa region, 38% in East Asia and Pacific region and 4% in
Europe, central Asia and other African regions.

However, there have been a number of incidents of privatizations involving ports
that have not worked out; In Indonesia, the Koja container terminal under private
management ran into difficulties and the public port company took back the facilities.

The city of Rostock, Germany demanded return of the terminal it contracted to a
private group for operation, citing lack of compliance with the original contract.

Following a dispute with the port Authority of Trieste, the commercial terminal
operator (Europe Combined Terminals - ECT) selected to operate the container
terminal in the port under a 30-year contract withdrew from the contract after
eighteen months. And unfortunately, the success story in Mombasa was reversed
when the commercial terminal operator terminated its contract with the port as a
result of breakdown of equipment that the government failed to refurbish or replace.

The above discussed are therefore the general pros and cons and cases of failure
that motivate or militate against the prevailing port reform trend.

In summary, this chapter has discussed the essence of privatisation by tackling
questions like why it is on the rise, where it is prevalent and how it applied in the
world over. This is very important because it defines the modalities and shows the
bases from which young developing nation can replicate and embrace in order to
cope with the current wave of port privatisation. The analysis given in this chapter
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also gives a wider spectrum of choice for ports in developing countries to make in
order to avoid a future failure in an investment in a facility like port which involves a
lot of fixed costs which are sunk costs.

The following chapter then discusses the port reforms taken by governments in
Kenya and Tanzania and gives a comparison between the port of Mombasa and Dar
es Salaam highlighting the advances made in each port with respect to the level of
privatisation and the trends therein. This follows the argument from chapters 3 and
4 on the rationale behind privatisation and looks at a contemporary situation of
seaport reforms in the two coastal states with sharp contrasts in their levels of
privatisation and verifies the notion of whether privatisation has proved to be a
solution for port operations or not.
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CHAPTER FIVE

5

5.1

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES SEAPORT REFORMS: A Case of Kenya and
Tanzania Ports
Introduction

Seaports systems in developing countries have been increasingly reflecting interport competition on an international basis and trends towards port privatisation.
Kenya and Tanzania are two neighbouring port states with virtually the same level of
port facilities but different levels of port reforms. The level of privatisation in the port
sector in Tanzania is much advanced compared with its counterpart in Kenya.
There is a very stiff competition for transhipment and transit traffic between these
ports emanating from their strategic positions vis-à-vis the landlocked neighbouring
countries of Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. This has made these two countries an
interesting and apt case study.

This chapter tracks the development of private sector initiatives in these respective
maritime states through a comparative study of their level of port privatisation with a
view to verify the otherwise universal standpoint of rising port privatisation. Port
performance indicators are used to verify and confirm the arguments.

An

assessment of the present and future projection of the general trend of port
privatisation in the world is also made.

5.2

Seaport reforms: the case of Kenya

5.2.1 Background of the Port of Mombasa
The port of Mombasa is managed by Kenya Ports Authority (KPA), a statutory body
under the Ministry of Transport set up by an Act of parliament in 1978.
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It is the largest in East Africa and serves, not only Kenya, but also the landlocked
countries of Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and
Southern Sudan. With an average depth of 11 meters, it handles a variety of
agricultural products in break bulk, containerized, and bulk form. It has 13 general
cargo berths, 3 container berths with four 40-ton ship-to-shore cranes and 72 reefer
points, and a 30,000-ton bulk grain receiving facility. Figure 10 shows a landscape
map of the port.

Figure 10: Landscape map of Mombasa Container terminal
Source: KPA (2005)
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As part of its modernization campaign, in 2005 KPA acquired new 4 panamax ship
to shore gantry cranes from China’s ZPMC, 12 new rubber tiered gantry cranes, 2
rail-mounted gantry cranes and 4 new reach stackers. Currently, there is
government support to privatize stevedoring and container operations, but the
process is proceeding slowly.

Figure 11: Location of Kenya
Source: Wikipedia (2006)

The port is the busiest on the East African Coast and a major port of call for
international shipping lines. It is strategically located to serve the whole of the great
lakes region and the horn of Africa.

5.2.2

Kenya’s Privatization Background

In 1991, the President of Kenya appointed a high level policy-making body, the
Parastatal Reform Programme Committee (PRPC) to supervise and coordinate the
parastatal reform program. The Executive Secretariat and Technical Unit (ESTU)
acted as the secretariat of PRPC. A Department of Government Investments and

56

Public Enterprises (DGIPE) within the Ministry of Finance to represent the
Government and to oversee the reform process of public enterprises was also
established.

The key features of this macroeconomic and structural reform program were a
reduction in the fiscal deficit and enhanced monetary discipline; liberalization of
external and internal markets; initiation of parastatal reform based upon
restructuring of strategic parastatals and divestiture of non-strategic enterprises;
improved government management through reduction of the size of the civil service
and reorganizing key ministries. The World Bank group, particularly the Private
Sector Advisory Services (PSAS), provided active consultation to the GOK to
conceptualize and articulate the overall strategy.

Kenya started to implement the Parastatal Reform Project in 1994. The objective of
this project, financed by the World Bank, was to support parastatal reform as a
means of reducing the Government’s role in the economy.

5.2.3

Restructuring Study for the KPA

During the last ten years the port of Mombasa has experienced acute problems in
managerial and operational fields which have adversely affected the overall port
performance.

Operational performance declined to such an extent that major

shipping lines imposed a surcharge on containers shipped to Mombasa.

The

imposition of this surcharge prompted the government to establish an interministerial task force that led to increased productivity within the container terminal.
The surcharge by shipping lines was a means to press for improvements. Some
temporary measures were put in place in the form of memorandum of understanding
(MOUs) between KPA and shipping lines in 1998 to use their own quay transfer and
yard equipment for operations in return of tariff rebates. This brought short term
relief. Before such temporal measures there were earlier on major restructuring
steps taken by the government through consultants as follows:
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In 1995 the Department of Government Investment and Public Enterprises of the
Ministry of Finance commissioned a Kenya ports Authority restructuring study. The
study was conducted by Hickling Corporation of Canada. The study proposed a
restructuring plan with emphasis on four broad elements including the following;
Introduction of new legislation to strengthen accountability of KPA, setting and
monitoring targets of performance and implementation of restructuring plan through
a performance contract between KPA and the Government, introducing changes in
the financial structure of KPA including a reduction in KPA's planned capital
programme, reduction of KPA's tariffs and payment of regular dividends and lastly
reintroducing private stevedores, leasing the container terminal to a private operator
and privatizing selected marine services of KPA.

The study recommended that the government should set and review port objectives
through a Performance Contract. Since the worldwide trend is towards
commercialization, the study recommended that the KPA should retain the core
fixed assets, but private companies should participate in the management of the
day-to-day operations of some aspects of the port. In this regard, the port should
accelerate its transformation into a land-lord port but retain ownership of major port
assets and either lease facilities or license private sector operations through a
transparent and competitive bidding process.

If all the recommendations of the study concerning operational activities of the port
were implemented, the move would confine KPA's role to regulatory issues and to
the role of landlord, in effect removing KPA from operational activities and functions,
which will be privatized. Unfortunately though the Hickling study was conducted
with a very high degree of professionalism, the recommendations to date are
unimplemented.

However signs today are that the current government under

pressure from World Bank looks serious to implement and has embarked on a
serious reform programme and there is every indication that the government is
seriously committed to restructuring the port services.
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5.2.4

The trend of port reform at the Port of Mombasa

In Sub-Saharan Africa, Mozambique and Kenya had been the only countries to
award private contracts for port operations. Mozambique awarded lease contracts
for Maputo coal terminals in 1993 and container terminals in 1996. Kenya entered
into a management contract for the container facility with an international operator
(Hutchison’s Port of Felixstowe Consultants) in 1996 that was later cancelled
because of lack of control as will be explained later in the study.

The World Bank supported the privatization process in Kenya through the Parastatal
Reform and Privatisation Technical assistance Credit Programme with respect to the
reform of the core and more strategic public enterprises.

The government however is pursuing a policy of economic reforms, which includes
economic liberalisation and divesture from parastatal organization including KPA,
but it is so slow that there are no any meaningful changes so far seen.

5.2.5

Bottlenecks to port privatisation in Kenya

On a global perspective private participation in the port sector has encountered
myriads of resistance all over the world ranging from social, political and even
security bottlenecks. A notable striking political and security example is the recent
tussle between DPWorld and the US administration over the P&O US based assets
after its acquisition of P&O Ports. Takeover encountered a lot of resistance from
politicians on a security and political standpoint to the extent that DPWorld has
decided to handover P&O American operations to a US entity to manage.

The same is now happening in India where Hutchison is facing security clearance
problems in its bid to enter the India market due to delays from the Indian
government in granting security clearance for the container terminal projects in
Mumbai and Chennai. In the past, HPH has been denied permission to bid for port
projects in India due to its perceived links with mainland Chinese authorities
(Nadkarni, 2006, July, 14).
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On the Kenyan perspective, the overall impact of the privatizations is rather modest,
in relation to the potential. This is because the more ambitious privatization program
adopted in 1997/98 is still largely at the level of intentions.

The World Bank’s Parastatal Reform Technical assistance Project had supported
development of a performance contract to bring in new private management. This
led to contracting of Hutchison Whampoa group in the Mombasa Port resulting in a
notable increase in the ports throughput.

However, eventually the managers

withdrew at the end of their contract because of difficulties in achieving the level of
day-to-day control from government for management which they felt was necessary
to implement agreed improvements.

Labour unions also stand as a bottleneck to the port privatisation initiative. KPA
employs nearly 5000 staff. So far the corporation is spending about 42% of its
revenue on wages despite the recent introduction of financial discipline at the port.
Overstaffing is evident, and a 50% reduction would be realistic. This has hampered
the process of privatisation due to high labour costs eating into the meagre profits
achieved. Both managerial staff and general workers are worried about a looming
retrenchment programme, which is expected to reduce KPA's bloated workforce to
3,500 workers.

While performance has improved a little, efficiency at the Port of Mombasa is still
relatively poor. Delays of containers are substantial; the dwell time for containers
cleared at the port averages over 18 days for domestic imports and almost 20 days
for transit containers. Even containers moved directly to the Inland container depots
(ICD) remain within the port area for almost eight days.

A key factor underlying the poor productivity is the low availability of cargo handling
equipment: poor design, limited access to foreign exchange to fund spares, poor
maintenance management, lengthy and cumbersome procurement procedures, and
inadequate coordination between the supplies department and the maintenance
department. This to a significant extent was responsible for the problems facing the
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KPA contract with the port of Felixstowe of the UK, which was intended to improve
operation efficiency of containerised traffic.

The poor state of the Mombasa-Nairobi highway, the major highway connecting the
port and its hinterland, has also contributed to the problem as a result of freight
delays between the port and the hinterland.

Customers are concerned about tampering and theft of goods at the port,
processing delays, the dilapidated facilities and a controversy over different rates
charged to companies handling similar commodities.

More significantly, the drop in volume of cargo loaded and unloaded has been
associated with poor port management. “Highly politicised selection of managers,
corruption, and disregard of professional standards and frequent changes of
management has created weaknesses in KPA's performance," as Otieno Kajwang,
an opposition Member of Parliament lamented recently.

The vexed subject of privatisation generated a heated debate both in and out of
Parliament with local leaders demanding that the government shelves the idea as
this would alienate the local community and cause uncalled for redundancies of
labour. Political and religious leaders have also opposed the privatisation saying it
could fall into the wrong hands and lead to total degradation of the asset.

Privatisation is also thought of being resisted by a cartel of well-connected
politicians and businessmen whose firms are contracted to the port. Most of these
companies perform non-specialised duties that could be done by the corporation's
workers at no extra cost.

These resistances are impacting negatively in terms of loss of transhipment and
transit markets to the neighbouring port of Dar es Salaam. Kenya is paying the
price for years of neglect to its port and road infrastructure as other ports on the
eastern seaboard vie to pick up the business it is losing. Since the Concession of
container terminal services in Dar-es-Salaam to HPH in 2000, Mr. Samson Luhigo,
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the Tanzania Ports Authority Director-General, contends that, delays have been
reduced and goods are reaching inland markets on schedule.

Kenya's Port of Mombasa is in danger of losing its historical dominance in the region
to Dar es Salaam. Landlocked countries have traditionally used Mombasa as their
port of choice for maritime freight services.

There are currently efforts and measures aimed at involving the private sector by the
new government.

However, those measures are likely to take time to come to

fruition and any delays in the face of stiff competition are likely to cost Kenya dearly.
Kenya needs a sustainable port policy in order to grow and become more efficient,
but will need to overcome the current inherent political contradictions and confusion.
To focus on improvement on the already inefficient public port management at the
cost of prevailing port development of privatisation is short-sighted and politically
bankrupt.

5.3
5.3.1

Seaport reforms: the case of Tanzania
Background of the Port of Dar es Salaam

The port of Dar es Salaam, located latitude 6.5 and longitude 39.17 east the major
port in Tanzania managed by Tanzania Port Authority (TPA), [Originally Tanzania
Harbours Authority, (THA)]. TPA presently owns Dar es Salaam, Tanga and Mtwara
ports.
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Figure 12: Location of Tanzania
Source: Site maps (2006)

TPA is a public corporation established on 15th April 2005 following the repeal of
THA Act No. 12/77 and enactment of TPA Act No. 17/2004 with the following
mandate: to establish and coordinate a system of harbours, to provide facilities
relating to Harbours and provide harbour services; with the approval of the minister,
to construct and operate new harbours; to construct, operate and maintain beacons
and other navigational aids, to carry on the business of stevedore, wharfage; to act
as a warehouseman to store goods, whether or not the goods have been or are to
be handled as cargo or carried by the authority; to consign goods on behalf of the
other persons to any place either within or outside the United Republic; With the
approval of the Minister, to act as carriers of goods or passengers by land or sea,
and to provide amenities or facilities that the Authority considers necessary or
desirable for persons making use of the facilities or services.

TPA has a workforce of about 4,000. Its major responsibilities include developing,
managing and promoting the port sector in Tanzania. The Authority is being
restructured to be a landlord port authority whilst most of the port operations will be
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performed by the private sector. The programme is scheduled to be completed by
the end of 2006.

5.3.2

Tanzania’s Privatization Background

Public owned organizations in Tanzania were a direct consequence of the country’s
policy of socialism and self-reliance, which was adopted in 1967. This resulted in
the nationalisation of all privately owned property in order to equally distribute
wealth. Upon doing this, the government established State Owned Enterprises
(SOEs). It was anticipated that faster economic development was forthcoming but
did not work.

The country’s economy continued to dwindle. Thus in 1992, the

parliament passed the Public Corporations Act, and its amendments in 1993
opening up its doors for private sector participation in the economic development of
the country.

Further development in this regard was in the establishment of the Presidential
Parastatal Sector Reform Commission (PSRC) in 1993 under the Public
Corporations Act (amendments) giving it the following powers; to specify
corporations for restructuring and execute detailed plans of specified corporations.
(Kakusa, 1999, p. 31)

5.3.3

Restructuring Study for the Tanzania Ports Authority

In 1994, THA in corroboration with the World Bank concluded a major development
study for the port of Dar es Salaam. The study chartered a 10 years plan, which
focused in improving physical, commercial, operational and financial efficiency of the
port. In line with government resolve to transform THA into landlord status and
giving to private operators all the operation activities of the port, the study
recommended establishment of business units for concessions to private
developers. The first candidate for privatisation was the container terminal business
unit.

In 1996 the Government adopted a milestone decision to include utilities and
infrastructure ventures in the privatisation agenda. Privatisation of utilities and other
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major transactions was done with the assistance of transaction or investment
advisors who were normally merchant banks and multinational consultancy firms.
This led to the commercialization study for Tanzania Ports Authority.

5.3.4

Privatisation strategy for TPA

The objectives in privatising TPA include: improving efficiency of port operations and
enhancing quality of services offered to customers, to improve the port's
competitiveness over other regional ports, and to improve profitability of port
operations.

5.3.5

Privatisation of the Dar es Salaam Container Terminal

According to the Presidential Parastatal Sector Reform Commission (PSRC), the
Government of Tanzania has successfully completed the privatisation of the
container terminal. After following an international competitive tender process, it
selected the winning bidder as the consortium of International Container Terminal
Services Inc, ICTSI International Holdings Corporation, both of Manila, Philippines
and Vertex Financial Services Ltd of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

The consortium formed and registered a local company at the end of April 2000
called Tanzania International Container Terminal Services Ltd (TICTS) with
International Container Terminal Services Inc. taking 51% of the shareholding,
ICTSI International Holdings Corporation 24% and Vertex Financial Services 25%.
The ten year lease contract was signed on 5 May 2000 and responsibility for running
and operating the Container Terminal was handed over to TICTS on 10 September
2000.

Subsequently ICTSI sold its shareholding to Hutchison International Port

Holdings Limited (HPH). In 2005 the Government extended the period of the lease
by a further fifteen years.

The privatisation process of the Dar es Salaam container terminal has bore fruit and
has been envied by many ports in the region. This is quickly becoming a paradigm
port in the region. The success seen from the Dar es Salaam example can be
pegged against the slow pace at which its counterpart, the Mombasa Container
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Terminal is dragging. A comparative study of performance between the Dar es
Salaam container terminal and the Mombasa Container Terminal is done in the next
section owing to their competitive situation and their different levels of liberalisation
with a view to show competitiveness of privately operated container terminals.

5.4

Comparative study: Mombasa against Dar es Salaam container terminals

The container terminal at the port of Mombasa is a 3-berth facility with a quay length
of 596 meters while that of Dar es Salaam is also a 3-berth facility but with 560
meters and both use the yard gantry system. The Dar es Salaam container terminal
as compared to the port of Mombasa registered tremendous improvements from
2001 in productivity. According to the Director General of TPA Mr. Samson Luhigo,
two factors have led to the 50% boost in productivity in recent years.

The first was a project completed in 2000 to deepen, widen and straighten the
entrance channel and to install navigation aids to allow 24-hour access to the port.
Average ship turnaround time was slashed as a result. This led to significant time
and money savings to forwarders and ship owners.

Secondly, Dar es Salaam container terminal was contracted to the Hutchison port
Holdings; as a result the port has the highest productivity rate in Eastern and
Southern Africa with container handling rates reaching 23 moves per crane per hour
(Luhigo, 2005, p. 18). This is different to the case of Mombasa as will be revealed
by the details in various categories of indicators analysed below.

A comparison in terms of transhipment traffic flow is given between the two ports to
show how this coveted traffic is shifting to the Port of Dar es Salaam due to the
privatisation programme. Productivity between the ports is also compared to show
why shippers and ship owners are getting attracted to the newly privatised container
terminal of Dar es Salaam.
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5.4.1

Transhipment Traffic

There is an apparent loss of transhipment traffic from the port of Mombasa to its
competitor, Dar es Salaam, as shown in Table 5, 6 and Figure 13.

Table 5: Mombasa container traffic (TEUs) 2001-2005

2001

2002

2003

2004

IMPORTS

134,497

143,359

173,39

203,918

EXPORTS

130,234

134,700

157,209

200,434

TRANSHIPMENTS

25,769

27,368

49,605

34,245

TOTAL

290,500

305,427

380,353

438,597

Source: KPA annual review and bulletin of statistics (2005).

Table 6: Dar es Salaam container traffic (TEUs) 2001-2004
2001

2002

2003

2004

IMPORTS

68,921

73,090

90,135

105,594

EXPORTS

66,519

68,927

77,663

93,730

TRANSHIP
MENTS

6,280

12,409

18,319

27,790

TOTAL

141,720

154,426

186,117

227,114

Source: THA port Statistical Unit (2005).

67

MOMBASA CONTAINER TRAFFIC (2001-2004)
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Figure 13: Mombasa Containerised Cargo (TEUs) From 2001-2004
Source: KPA annual review and bulletin of statistics (2005)

DAR ES SALAAM CONTAINER TRAFFIC (2001-2004)
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Figure 14: Dar es Salaam Containerised Cargo (TEUs) from 1998-2004
Source: THA port statistical unit (2005)

From Tables 2 and 3, transhipment cargo has slowly been shifting to Dar es Salaam
after privatisation of Dar es Salaam terminal had started to be felt.

This has

apparently been brought by the better services shipping lines are getting from the
port of Dar es salaam in the form of shorter port time, due to high productivity,
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translating to reduced turnaround time and cost savings. Since transhipment in not
captive to Mombasa the continued delay in privatisation will further dwindle and
impact negatively on the port as seen from the sharp decline being experienced
from 2003.

5.4.2

Ship performance

Ship performance has also improved since Hutchison took over the Dar es Salaam
terminal with remarkable crane productivity never seen in any of the competing ports
in the region. Crane productivity at the port of Dar es Salaam is revealed to be even
double the one at the port of Mombasa as shown in Table 7.

Moves/Hour (net-SSG)
Table 7: Comparative Crane performances

2003

2004

Mombasa Container Terminal

10.12

9.05

Dar es salaam Container Terminal

23.2

23.5

Sources: KPA annual review and bulletin of statistics, 2005 and PTA statistical unit

5.4.3

Ship Traffic

The improved productivity evidenced has led to an increase in the ship traffic at the
Port of Dar es Salaam compared to the Port of Mombasa. This has contributed to a
drop in the number of ships calling the Port of Mombasa citing congestion and poor
services. This is evidently seen in Figure 15. The number of ships is gradually
diminishing at the port of Mombasa in favor of Dar es Salaam terminal since its
privatization.
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5.4.4. Number of Ships Worked at Mombasa and Dar es Salaam terminals

Table 8: Ship traffic in Mombasa and Dar es Salaam
2001

2002

2003

2004

1,052

1,110

994

939

Dar es salaam Container Terminal 1123

1405

1502

1680

Mombasa Container Terminal

Source: KPA 2005 annual bulletin of statistics and & TPA statistical unit (2005)

Mombasa and Dar es Salaam ship traffic
(2001-2004)
Mombasa
Container
Terminal
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Number of 1,500
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Dar es
Salaam
Container
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Figure 15: Comparison of trends in the ship traffic
Source: KPA 2005 annual bulletin of statistics and & TPA statistical unit (2005)

5.4.4

Terminal Occupancy

The above mentioned indicators have ultimately resulted into a rise in the berth
occupancy at the port of Mombasa suggesting a long waiting of ships and no rest
periods of terminal quays, a recipe for poor performance. It is important to note here
that the ship service time is too high and very significant that it outweighs the
relatively reduced traffic thus affecting the terminal occupancy despite the reduction
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in ship traffic. This is shown Table 9 and 10. The bottom line is the difference in the
ship productivity between these terminals.

Terminal Occupancy at the Port of Mombasa

The terminal occupancy at the port of Mombasa is increasing despite the fall in the
number of ship calls as shown in Table 9 and Figure 16. This can be partly
attributed partly to the increase in size of the ships arriving mainly to the poor ship
productivity while it is the other way round in the port of Dar es Salaam where the
terminal occupancy is falling with increased ship calls. This is partly attributed to the
new investment in channel straightening and installation of navigational lights and
also due to the concession to Hutchison port holdings.

Table 9: Mombasa container terminal occupancy

YEAR

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

Occupancy (%)

71.5

72.6

75.7

82.6

87.3

Source: KPA Annual Review and Bulletin of Statistics (2005).

Mombasa port terminal occupancy
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Figure 16: Mombasa container terminal occupancy.
Source: KPA annual review and bulletin of statistics (2005).
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Terminal occupancy at the Port of Dar es Salaam

Comparatively the terminal occupancy at the Port of Dar es Salaam is lower though
fluctuating due to the relatively higher ship productivity as shown in table 7 and
Figure 15.

Table 10: Dar es Salaam container terminal occupancy
YEAR

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

Occupancy (%)

45

43.5

47.5

48.5

43.9

Source: THA port Statistical Unit (2005)

Dar es Salaam port terminal Occupancy
50
48
46
Occupancy(%)
44
42
40

Berth Occupancy(%)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Year

Figure 17: Dar es Salaam Container terminal occupancy.
Source: THA port Statistical Unit (2005)

Again this manifests and buttresses the privatisation concept, and with the examples
of the good news privatisation is revealing, the Port of Dar es Salaam act as an
example to other ports and this in turn will likely lead to more privatisation schemes
and thus a continued positive trend in concessions and privatisation. This then
draws us to the question: What does the future hold for port concessions and
privatisation in the world? This is the question that the next section seeks to answer.
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5.5

What does the future hold for port privatisation and concessions?

The future is bright. As earlier on discussed in Chapter 3, port administrators and
governments are increasingly opting for port concessions as a means to improve
port productivity or as a means to invest in new container terminals on green fields
through floatation of bids all over the world. In Spain for example, the Spanish
government is under pressure to reform Spain’s commercial ports. According to the
Barcelona Port Authority chairman, Mr. Coello, ports should be managed like limited
companies (EaLes, 2006, p. 30). He is pushing the government to establish an
independent management company for the port that would be neither dependant on
Spain’s government port entity, Puertos del Estado, nor be controlled by the Catalan
regional government.

The government of Pakistan also is seeking bids for a deepwater terminal. The
Karachi Port Trust is looking for a terminal operator for its proposed Pakistan
Deepwater Container port at Keamari, comprising 10 berths (Siddiqi, July 21, 2006).
Private sector participation is proposed to be on a build-operate-transfer basis and
25-year renewable lease. The successful bidder will build and equip the 65-hectare
back-up area as a high throughput terminal, including container yards, storage and
transfer areas, operational buildings, cranes, gantries and supporting equipment to
handle a minimum of 1.5m TEUs annually. The dissertation also gave many other
cases of this kind replicating the situation of future investments in port with private
participants in Chapter three. This shows that there is no sign of abating and the
trend will continue.

Another testimony to the future prospects of port privatisation and concessions can
be exemplified by the 40-year concession award to the German headquartered
terminal operator Eurogate to run the proposed Jadeweserport container terminal
development at the German port of Wilhelmshaven (Marle, 2006, p. 9). This is yet a
project for the future thus offering support for the forecasts. The project is expected
to begin operations in 2009.

Further cementing the conviction that the future for port privatisation is bright is an
interesting study carried out by the UK-based Ocean Shipping Consultants (OSC),
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which analysed the demand for container port through the dramatic development in
container handling activities in the East Asian ports for the period up to 2020. The
report highlighted the huge increase in traffic routed through Chinese ports whereby
between 2000 and 2005, the regions share of container throughput advanced from
12.9% to 58.3%.

The study revealed that the total container port demand is

forecasted to increase by between 102% and 126% over the period 2004 to 2020 to
a maximum threshold of 487 million TEUs (Fossey, July 2006). This clearly shows
that more concessions will take place because as the demand for ports increases
more and more governments and port administrators will look for avenues to
improve capacity and efficiency as well as investments on new green fields mostly
through private participation due to reasons earlier on discussed in this study.
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CHAPTER SIX

6

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter is drawn from the synthesis of the work done in this entire dissertation.
It gives a standpoint reflecting the revelations and the future projection of the
research question in light with the background and current situation.
6.1

Conclusion

From observations in this study, a supposition can be reached that the increased
trend in transferring government port operations and assets to the private sector
suggests that public ports can benefit from greater private-sector participation.
Driving this trend is the growing realization that government control of port
operations and often ownership of port assets is not consistent with efficient,
market-responsive port management.

Lacking exposure to full competitive

pressures, publicly owned and operated ports have weaker incentive to efficiently
allocate labour and capital resources and are more likely to be subject to extraneous
political influences.

From the case studies illustrating the port privatization trend discussed, the study
has also shown that the use of privatisation to accelerate port development or
improve efficiency has proved to be of tremendous benefits in many areas of the
world thus resulting in the current universal trend.

In addition, while governments, the world over face growing demands to develop
transportation infrastructure as means of promoting trade and enhancing economic
development, they lack the necessary resources to maintain and modernize these
capital-intensive facilities.

Therefore the privatization trend shows no sign of

abating.
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Also the study revealed that the most commonly adopted schemes for privatisation
of port services are lease of port infrastructure, superstructure and equipment and
concession arrangements in the form of BOT, BOO or BOOT.

These are the

recommended schemes since they do not involve the comprehensive sale of a port,
but rather the partial transfer of port facilities to a private sector enterprise. However
it was seen that it is advisable and should be required that the privatised facilities be
managed and operated on a common user basis, and the private port operator
should offer to use the privatised facility, with no discrimination whatsoever to allow
flexibility to be preserved in order to avoid foreclosure.

The study also found out that since these concessions involve retaining of port
regulatory function in the landlord status, port administrations have favoured this
mode of private participation due to the advantage of avoiding a replacement of
public with a private monopoly through clauses in the contracts encouraging
competition and contestability. This fact is also emphasised by professor Cariou of
World Maritime University (personal communication, July 2006) who contends that,
the crucial element is not to reach to an agreement through a concession but to be
sure that contestability is preserved in the long run.

Taking a purely economic standpoint, it can be concluded that port privatisation has
contributed to improved efficiency in many cases.

However, through a critical

analysis of this study it has been observed that though the trend in port privatization
is upward all over the world, there are publicly operated terminals that rival any
private terminals for productivity and cost effectiveness.

This has led to the

conclusion that port privatization is neither a panacea nor a peril but a concept that
has evolved to facilitate trade in a world where competition has become the
universal norm.

6.2

Recommendations

International port competition is breaking out of easily defined boundaries and is
becoming more complex. It is therefore not enough to keep pace with the slowest
local competitor but one has to instead respond to the challenge of the fastest,
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wherever he may be. This has resulted in Privatisation now becoming like a tidal
wave; if you resist it you will be swept away and if you ride on it you will go far.
However, riding on the privatisation wave without strategic plans and appropriate
institutional and eco-political prerequisites could lead to a commercial and social
fiasco or quagmire. To outline this point, the study revealed recent failures and
success stories where either the right or adequate dose of institutional preparations,
socio economic and political factors were ignored or were not prescribed at all.

It is therefore prudent upon port administrations and governments all over the world
to be very careful when making decisions relating to inviting private participants in
their port operations. It is thus recommended that a properly structured scheme for
port privatisation should be put in place in order to realise increased productivity and
lower costs to port users.

This is only possible through port administrators and policy makers seeking advice
and inputs from logistics experts, trade economists and port management
professionals from institutions like WMU, UNCTAD and the World Bank when
strategising port privatisation initiatives.

Their contribution is very vital as it will

ensure creation of a policy development that is cognisant of the interrelationships of
shippers and ship owners and other port users as well as implementation of
methods guaranteeing maximum benefits to public and commercial interests. This
is very vital because port investment is a long-term venture with a lot of fixed costs
that are sunk.

It is also recommended that when awarding a concession, the private operator
should be given the freedom to manage the facility in the way he/she sees fit but
within the limits as deemed to be of the highest value to the government. Hence
certain clauses and performance agreements should be built in the system, to
trigger corrective action by the government or port administration when necessary.
For example control from the port authority in the area of port pricing is fundamental.
This is important to avoid cases of discriminatory pricing practices, to defend the
interests of the cargo shippers and importers, to avoid monopoly pricing abuses and
to control excessive price fluctuations as a result of extreme inter port competition.

77

Also very basic and important is the fact that the award of concessions and lease
contracts should be a public and transparent process. This is vital prerequisite
because it installs confidence in both the bidders and the general public who are
traditionally sceptical. The private operator as a precondition should be a company
with the necessary experience and should have proved its qualifications, expertise
and experience in similar project activities in order to avoid novices who can ruin a
well planned scheme.

Within the study questions were posed about whether a port authority is necessary
after privatisation since private operators often argue that a port authority is just an
institution representing another layer of bureaucracy without any benefits.

The

appropriate recommendation here is that. Yes it is. There is a strong case for
retention owing to their control and long term planning capabilities that are lacking in
the private sector, port promotion and training, setting national macro economic
targets, policy formulation, and the fulfilment of the regulatory, supervisory and
surveillance role. But it is also important as stated earlier that the privatisation
reforms should not be a case where the terms and conditions are heavily in favour
of the landlord port. This is currently causing hues and cries in India port
privatisation reforms.

Privatisation especially in developing countries needs to take into consideration the
human resource element. Privatisation success does not just mean handing over
land, land equipment and operations to private companies. People are involved too,
and their interests have to be taken into account and protected. The success of any
port privatisation by a government MUST not be at the expense of the society
through unnecessary redundancy and the addition of financial burdens on its
citizenry without any benefits.

From the comparative study between the Mombasa and the Dar es Salaam
container terminals with the key performance indicators it appeared explicitly that
Dar es Salaam, where privatisation had taken place, is forging ahead in all
departments relative to Mombasa.

It is therefore recommended that Mombasa
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should embrace port reforms before worse comes to worst as the privatisation trend
shows no sign of abating.

The lesson learnt is that private sector engagement mainly affects three groups of
people namely, the public, the private and the unions. The International Transport
Workers’ Federation supports privatisation. For its part, the private sector must
listen to demands of the union and, jointly with the public sector, find solutions for
rightful labour demands. In any case, a public monopoly should not be replaced by
a private monopoly. After all, the public monopoly is there to serve all, whereas the
private one has only to serve its shareholders.
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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Port of Singapore Performance
Year

2001

2001

2003

2004

2005

15,571.1

16,940.9

18,410.5

21,329.1

23,192.2

Container
throughput
(000 TEUs)
Source: Maritime and Port of Singapore Authority (2006)

Port of Singapore was ranked first globally in 2005 in terms of containerised traffic,
with 23.2 million TEUs handled.

It handles about one-fifth of the world's total

container transhipment throughput. The port is the world’s busiest. The Singapore
government corporatised PSA in October 1997 and assumed the structure and
operations of a private company with the Singapore government as the single
shareholder, through its investment arm, the Temasek holdings. Despite being still
a public port it is one of the most competitive and efficient port in the world.
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Appendix B: Container Terminals in Singapore Port

port

Operator

Type

Berths

Quay
length

Quay
cranes

Brani (BT)

PSA

Container

9

2,629

Cosco-PSA (CPT)

Cosco/PSA Container

2

720 m

22.8

Jurong

JTC

MultiPurpose

23

4,547

152

Keppel (KT)

PSA

Container

14

3,220

37

96

Pasir Panjang (PPT)
PSA
Phase 1

Container

6

1,885

19

71

Pasir Panjang (PPT)
PSA
Phase 2A

Container

4

1,700

19

63

Pasir Panjang (PPT)
PSA
Phase 2B

Container

4

1,246

16

56

Pasir Panjang (PPT)
PSA
Phase 2C

Container

7

Pasir Panjang (PPT)
PSA
Phase 2D

Container

5

Pasir Panjang (PPT)
PSA
Phase 3

Container

Pasir Panjang (PPT)
PSA
Phase 4

Container

Pasir Panjang
Wharves

PSA

General

Sembawang

PSA

General
2,320

27

80

Tanjong Pagar (TPT) PSA

Container

Source: Port of Singapore (2006)
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8

29

Area
(Ha)
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Appendix C: Map of East Africa and its landlocked neighbours

Source: African maps (2006)
http://images.google.com/images?hl=en&q=maps%20of%20africa&sa=N&tab=wi
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Appendix D: Allocation of responsibilities under the World Bank models

Responsibilities
Infrastructure
Superstructure
port labor
Other functions

Service
Public
Public
Public
Majority Public

Tool
Public
Public
Private
Mixed

Landlord
Public
Private
Private
Mixed

Private
Private
Private
Private
Majority
Private

Responsibilities

Service

Tool

Landlord

Private

Advantages/

1.Develop-

1. Avoidance

1. The same

1. This

Strength

ment

of duplication

entity both

model often

and operations

of facilities

executes

results in

are the

because

operations and

investment

responsibility

investment

owns

in port

of only one

In

the cargo-

operations

entity, making

infrastructure

handling

that are

for a

and equipment

equipment;

flexible.

streamlined

is provided by

therefore, the

Port

and cohesive

the public

planning is

develop-

approach to

sector.

likely to result

ment and

in better

tariff policies

outcomes

tend to be

and be more

market

likely greater

oriented.

growth.

responsiveness to
changing
market
conditions.
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Responsibilities
Disadvantages/

Service
1.Lack of

Tool
1.Fragment-

Landlord
1. There is a

Private
1.This type

Weaknesses

internal

ation in

risk of over-

of model

competition

responsibility

capacity as

may result

can lead to

for cargo-

more than one

in

inefficient port

handling can

private

monopolistic

administration,

lead to conflict

operator may

behavior as

or to a lack of

between small

pressure for

well as a

innovation,

operators and

expansion.

loss of

and services

between the

that are not

stevedoring

2. There may

involvement

user-oriented

companies

be duplication

in

or market

and port

of marketing

developing

oriented.

administrators

effort as both

long-term

terminal

economic

Dependence

public

on

2. There is

operators and

policy and

government

also a risk of

the port

strategies

for funding

under-

authority visit

may lead to

investment.

potential

wasteful use

Strong

customers;

of resources

stevedoring

greater co-

or under-

companies are

ordination of

investment.

not developed

marketing and

as a local

planning is

economic

required with

benefit.

this model.

Source: Source: Adapted from World Bank Port Reform Tool Kit, module 3, p. 21
(2001) and (Brooks, 2004)
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Appendix E: Forecast of growth in containerization in the world (1999-2015)

Source: Ocean Shipping Company, OSC (2000)
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